KaydedilenlerDerginizi ekleyin

Dergiler / Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy / 2020 / Cilt: 10 - Sayı: 1

A Dilemma for Epistemic Infinitism

Epistemik Sonsuzluk İçin İkilem

Erhan DEMİRCİOĞLU
Sayfa
13–22
DOI
—
🏛️Bu makalenin bibliyografik verileri ve tam metin bağlantısı DergiPark üzerinden sağlanmıştır.
DergiPark Kaydı ↗
✨

Yapay Zeka Hızlı Bakış & Çıkarımlar

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

I argue that epistemic infinitism can offer a non-skeptical stance only by forgoing the very ground for thinking that it is true.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

🎯
Amaç & Hipotez:I argue that epistemic infinitism can offer a non-skeptical stance only by forgoing the very ground for thinking that it is true.
📊
Temel Bulgular & Veri:I argue that epistemic infinitism can offer a non-skeptical stance only by forgoing the very ground for thinking that it is true.
💡
Sonuç & Katkı:I argue that epistemic infinitism can offer a non-skeptical stance only by forgoing the very ground for thinking that it is true.
🔬Tür:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:Alan Parametreleri

Özet

I argue that epistemic infinitism can offer a non-skeptical stance only by forgoing the very ground for thinking that it is true.

Abstract

Epistemik sonsuzluğun, ancak, doğru olduğunu düşünmek için zemin hazır-layarak kuşkucu-olmayan bir duruş sunabileceğini iddia ediyorum.

🔖

Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

DEMİRCİOĞLU, E. (2020). A Dilemma for Epistemic Infinitism. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, Cilt: 10 - Sayı: 1, 13–22. https://ajindex.com/articles/142632

📄 Tam Metin PDF Okuyucu

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...

Kaynakça (11)

  1. Aikin, S. (2008). Meta-epistemology and the Varieties of Epistemic Infinitism. Synthese, 163, 175-185
  2. Alston, W. (1985). Concepts of Epistemic Justification. The Monist, 68 (1), 57-89.
  3. BonJour, L. (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-versity Press.
  4. Clark, R. (1988). Vicious Infinite Regress Arguments. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 369-380.
  5. Dancy, J. (1985). An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Basil Black-well. Gillett, C. (2003). Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein. Philosophy and Phenom-enological Research, 66 (3), 709-717.
  6. Kajamies, T. (2009). A Quintet, a Quartet, a Trio, a Duo? Philosophia, 37, 525-534.
  7. Klein, P. (1999). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. Philo-sophical Perspectives, 13, 297-325.
  8. Klein, P. (2005). Infinitism is the Solution to the Regress Problem. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. (Eds. M. Steup & E. Sosa). Oxford: Blackwell Pub-lishing. Klein, P. (2007). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning. Philosophical Studies, 134, 1-17.
  9. Moser, P. (1985). Whither Infinite Regresses of Justification? The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1), 65-74.
  10. Peijnenburg, J. & Atkinson, D. (2013). The Emergence of Justification. The Philo-sophical Quarterly, 63 (252), 546-564.
  11. Sellars, W. (1997). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.