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Dergiler / Gazi İktisat ve İşletme Dergisi / 2024 / Cilt: 10 Sayı: 3

CEO kökeni ve genel yönetsel beceriler: Borsa İstanbul’da işlem gören firmalar üzerine bir araştırma

CEO origin and general managerial skills: A research on firms listed on Borsa Istanbul

Pelin Erden Çevik(Jandarma ve Sahil Güvenlik Akademisi)0000-0002-0997-2813
Sayfa
431–446
Yayın Tarihi
2024-10-30
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Araştırma bulguları, 112 CEO’nun firma içinden terfi ettirilerek, 127 CEO’nun ise dışarıdan atanarak bu pozisyona getirildiğini ve dışarıdan atanan CEO’ların genel yönetsel beceri düzeyinin içeriden terfi edenlere göre anlamlı derecede yüksek olduğunu göstermiştir.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

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Amaç & Hipotez:Bu çalışmanın amacı, literatürde örtük bir şekilde kabul edilen, ancak hakkında yeterli ampirik kanıt bulunmayan, dışarıdan atanan CEO’ların yüksek genel yönetsel beceri düzeyine sahip olduğu varsayımını Türkiye bağlamında test etmektir.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:Araştırma, Borsa İstanbul’da işlem gören firmaların mevcut CEO’larından 2013-2023 yılları arasında göreve getirilmiş olan 239 CEO ile yürütülmüş ve araştırmada kullanılan tüm veriler yazar tarafından elle toplanmıştır.
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Sonuç & Katkı:Araştırma bulguları, 112 CEO’nun firma içinden terfi ettirilerek, 127 CEO’nun ise dışarıdan atanarak bu pozisyona getirildiğini ve dışarıdan atanan CEO’ların genel yönetsel beceri düzeyinin içeriden terfi edenlere göre anlamlı derecede yüksek olduğunu göstermiştir.
🔬Tür:Literatür & Derleme Çalışması
📍Kapsam:2013-2023 Verileri
⚙️Değişkenler:genel yönetsel beceri · dışarıdan CEO · içeriden CEO

Özet

Bu çalışmanın amacı, literatürde örtük bir şekilde kabul edilen, ancak hakkında yeterli ampirik kanıt bulunmayan, dışarıdan atanan CEO’ların yüksek genel yönetsel beceri düzeyine sahip olduğu varsayımını Türkiye bağlamında test etmektir. Araştırma, Borsa İstanbul’da işlem gören firmaların mevcut CEO’larından 2013-2023 yılları arasında göreve getirilmiş olan 239 CEO ile yürütülmüş ve araştırmada kullanılan tüm veriler yazar tarafından elle toplanmıştır. CEO kökeni belirlenirken, literatürde yaygın olarak kabul edilen yöntem izlenmiş ve CEO olmadan önce bir yıldan uzun süredir firmada çalışanlar içeriden, bir yıl ve daha az süredir çalışanlar ise dışarıdan CEO olarak tanımlanmıştır. CEO’ların genel yönetsel beceri düzeyi ise Custodio, Ferreira ve Matos (2013) tarafından geliştirilen “Genel Beceri Endeksi” ile ölçülmüştür. Araştırma bulguları, 112 CEO’nun firma içinden terfi ettirilerek, 127 CEO’nun ise dışarıdan atanarak bu pozisyona getirildiğini ve dışarıdan atanan CEO’ların genel yönetsel beceri düzeyinin içeriden terfi edenlere göre anlamlı derecede yüksek olduğunu göstermiştir. Böylece dışarıdan atanan CEO’ların genelci olduğu varsayımı, ülkemiz yönetici işgücü piyasası bağlamında doğrulanmıştır. Araştırma bulguları, CEO değişimlerinde son yılların önemli trendlerinden biri haline gelen dışarıdan CEO transferinin önemli bir sebebinin, farklı kurumsal çevrelerde deneyim kazanmış genelci CEO’ların sahip olduğu, firmalar açısından gittikçe önem kazanan üstün genel yönetsel becerileri olduğu şeklinde yorumlanabilir.

Abstract

The aim of this research is to test the hypothesis that outsider CEOs have high general managerial skills, which is implicitly accepted in the literature but for which there is limited empirical evidence in the Turkish context. The research was conducted with 239 CEOs who were appointed between 2013-2023 among the current CEOs of the firms listed on Borsa Istanbul and the data used in the research were hand-collected. While determining the origin of CEOs, the method widely accepted in the literatüre is followed, and those who worked for a firm for more than one year prior to CEO position were defined as an insider CEO, while those who worked for one year or less were defined as an outsider CEO. The general managerial skill level of CEOs was measured by the “General Skill Index” developed by Custodio, Ferreira and Matos (2013). The results showed that 112 CEOs were insiders and 127 CEOs were outsiders, and the general managerial skill level of outsider CEOs was significantly higher than that of insiders. Thus, the assumption that outsider CEOs are generalists is confirmed in the context ofTurkey’s managerial labor market. The results of the research can be interpreted as a justification of external CEO transfers, which have become one of the most important trends in CEO turnover in recent years, that is the superior general managerial skills of generalist CEOs who have gained experience in different corporate environments, which have become increasingly important for firms.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

Çevik, P. E. (2024). CEO kökeni ve genel yönetsel beceriler: Borsa İstanbul’da işlem gören firmalar üzerine bir araştırma. Gazi İktisat ve İşletme Dergisi, Cilt: 10 Sayı: 3, 431–446. https://doi.org/10.30855/gjeb.2024.10.3.008

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