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AI InsightMakalenin özgün katkısı, bu süreci Fârâbî örneği üzerinden, İslâm düşüncesinde hakikatin rasyonel temelini kurma çabasının ilk sistemli uygulanışı olarak ele alması ve yorum sorunlarına dair çözümlemeler yapmasıdır.
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Özet
Bu çalışma Aristoteles’in Organon’unun İslâm düşünce geleneğinde otorite metin hâline gelme sürecini ve bu sürecin ortaya çıkardığı metodolojik, dilsel ve metinsel sorunları Fârâbî’nin düşünce sistemi bağlamında analiz etmektedir. Organon felsefî düşünmenin meşruiyet ölçütünü belirleyen bir otorite metin olarak kabul edilmiştir. Çalışma, kanonlaştırma sürecini Fârâbî’nin düşünce sistemi bağlamında ele alarak şu üç soruya cevap aramaktadır: Birincisi, Fârâbî, Aristoteles mantığına atfettiği otoriteyi hangi gerekçelerle temellendirmektedir? İkincisi, mantığın Fizik ve Metafizik’ten önce edinilmesi gereken bir “düşünce ahlâkı” olarak konumlandırılması bu otoriteyle nasıl ilişkilidir? Üçüncüsü, Grekçeden Arapçaya aktarımın terminolojik sorunlarıyla Aristoteles’in kastı ve takipçilerinin yorumları arasındaki farklılık, bu otoritenin niteliğini nasıl etkilemektedir? Çalışmanın bulgusu, Fârâbî’nin Aristoteles mantığına atfettiği otoritenin sadece bir gelenek aktarımı olmayıp bir düşünme biçiminin kanonlaştırılması olduğu ve bu kanonlaştırmanın, metinlerin tarihselliğiyle hakikat iddiasının evrenselliği arasındaki ilişkiyi düzenleyen yöntemsel bir norm ürettiğidir. Makalenin özgün katkısı, bu süreci Fârâbî örneği üzerinden, İslâm düşüncesinde hakikatin rasyonel temelini kurma çabasının ilk sistemli uygulanışı olarak ele alması ve yorum sorunlarına dair çözümlemeler yapmasıdır.
Abstract
This study investigates the process through which Aristotle’s logical corpus attained the status of a canonical text within the Islamic intellectual tradition, focusing on al-Farabi. Rather than treating this process as the mere transmission of an inherited philosophical corpus, the study approaches it as the establishment of a normative mode of reasoning that determines the conditions of legitimate knowledge. The central problem stems from an apparently contradictory stance in al-Farabi’s thought: he attributes a foundational and binding authority to Aristotelian logic while simultaneously identifying historical, linguistic, terminological, and thematic limitations within the very texts to which he assigns this authority. The study asks how these two positions can be reconciled and what exactly becomes authoritative in Aristotelian logic once its wording, examples, and terminology prove to be historically conditioned. Three interrelated questions structure the inquiry. First, on what grounds does al-Farabi base the authority he attributes to Aristotelian logic? Second, how is this authority related to his characterization of logic as a discipline that must be acquired prior to the study of physics and metaphysics? Third, how do the terminological difficulties that arose in transferring these texts from Greek into Arabic, together with the gap between Aristotle’s intention and later commentators’ readings, affect the nature of this authority? The study proceeds through comparative analysis and conceptual examination, situating al-Farabi’s discussions of logic, demonstration, language and interpretation alongside the positions of earlier figures within the tradition. The analysis shows that the authority granted to logic derives from its claim to a universal methodological function rather than from the fixity of its wording. Al-Farabi’s comparison between grammar and logic clarifies this point: whereas grammar regulates correct usage within a particular language, logic supplies rules for correct reasoning concerning intelligibles independently of any language, and this universality distinguishes its authority from the local character of linguistic expression. Yet a universal method must still be articulated through a historically and linguistically particular text and this requirement generates the problem under discussion. Al-Farabi does not treat the wording of Aristotle’s texts as immutable; he notes that certain examples have lost their validity, that some subjects require replacement and that terminological usage is at times imprecise, and he accepts that these elements must be reformulated according to the intellectual context of the Muslim community. His recourse to earlier commentators further indicates that an authoritative text still requires interpretation to function as a methodological criterion, even as such interpretation must remain under methodological control so that arbitrary readings do not undermine the criterion itself. The study concludes that historicization and canonization are not opposed processes in al-Farabi’s thought but two aspects of a single operation: what becomes authoritative is not the historical wording of the text but the demonstrative method that can be detached from its contingent linguistic and cultural form. As the text is historicized, the method is thereby rendered universal, and al-Farabi’s contribution lies in reconstructing this method within a new language, social context and epistemic order, rather than in reproducing Aristotelian logic unchanged.