Dergiler / Pamukkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi / 2026 / Sayı: 64

YÖNETİM KURULUNDA CİNSİYET ÇEŞİTLİLİĞİ BİLGİ ASİMETRİĞİNİ AZALTIR MI? ABD’DEN KANITLAR

DOES BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY REDUCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY? EVIDENCE FROM THE USA

Sayfa
215–230
Yayın Tarihi
2024-09-20
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Çalışmanın bir diğer sonucuna göre, kritik kütle teorisi altında, şirket yönetiminde üç veya daha fazla kadının olması asimetrik bilginin azaltılmasına daha fazla katkı sağlamaktadır.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

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Amaç & Hipotez:Kadın yöneticilerin firmaların finansal, ekonomik ve sürdürülebilirlik alanlarına katkıları açıktır.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:Bu çalışmanın amacı, şirket yönetiminde kadın çeşitliliğinin bilgi asimetrisi üzerindeki etkisini araştırmaktır.
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Sonuç & Katkı:Çalışmanın bir diğer sonucuna göre, kritik kütle teorisi altında, şirket yönetiminde üç veya daha fazla kadının olması asimetrik bilginin azaltılmasına daha fazla katkı sağlamaktadır.
🔬Tür:Modelleme & Sayısal Simülasyon
📍Kapsam:2008-2023 Verileri
⚙️Değişkenler:Bilgi Asimetrisi · Yönetim Kurulunda Cinsiyet Çeşitliliği · Cinsiyet Eşitliği

Özet

Kadın yöneticilerin firmaların finansal, ekonomik ve sürdürülebilirlik alanlarına katkıları açıktır. Bununla birlikte, kadın yöneticiler asimetrik bilginin azaltılmasında da kilit bir rol oynayabilir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, şirket yönetiminde kadın çeşitliliğinin bilgi asimetrisi üzerindeki etkisini araştırmaktır. Çalışma, vekalet teorisi ve kritik kütle teorisine atıfta bulunmaktadır. Çalışmanın analizlerinde cinsiyet eşitliği, yönetim kurulu çeşitliliği ve kontrol değişkenleri kullanılmıştır. Bu çalışmada, değişkenler arasındaki ilişkiyi analiz etmek için sıradan en küçük kareler (OLS) modeli kullanılmıştır. Ayrıca, içsellik sorunlarını analiz etmek için sabit etki, kantil regresyon ve gecikme tahmin modelleri kullanılmıştır. Çalışmada S&P500 endeksinde yer alan 401 Amerikan şirketinin 2008-2023 yılları arasındaki yıllık verileri kullanılmıştır. Çalışmanın sonuçları, şirket yönetiminde cinsiyet çeşitliliğinin faydaları konusundaki güncel tartışmalara farklı test ve teorilerle katkı sağlamaktadır. Çalışmanın sonuçlarına göre, şirketlerin yönetim kurullarında kadın sayısının artması asimetrik bilginin azalmasına katkı sağlamaktadır. Çalışmanın bir diğer sonucuna göre, kritik kütle teorisi altında, şirket yönetiminde üç veya daha fazla kadının olması asimetrik bilginin azaltılmasına daha fazla katkı sağlamaktadır.

Abstract

The contributions of women managers to the financial, economic and sustainability areas of firms are obvious. However, women managers can also play a key role in reducing asymmetric information. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of gender diversity in corporate management on information asymmetry. The study refers to agency theory and critical mass theory. Gender equality, board diversity and control variables are used in the analyses. In the study, an ordinary least squares (OLS) model is used to analyse the relationship of variables. In addition, fixed effect, quantile regression and lag estimation models are used to analyse endogeneity problems. The annual data of 401 American companies listed in the S&P500 index between 2008 and 2023 were used in the sample. The results of the study contribute to the current debate on the benefits of gender diversity in corporate management with different tests and theories. According to the results of the study, increasing the number of women on the board contributes to the reduction of information asymmetry. According to another result of the study, under the critical mass theory, having three or more women in the company management contributes more to the reduction of information asymmetry.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

Özparlak, G. (2024). YÖNETİM KURULUNDA CİNSİYET ÇEŞİTLİLİĞİ BİLGİ ASİMETRİĞİNİ AZALTIR MI? ABD’DEN KANITLAR. Pamukkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Sayı: 64, 215–230. https://doi.org/10.30794/pausbed.1494040

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