Sinn as a Mode of Presentation

Abstract

For Frege, sense emerges from modes of presentation of the object. Based on Frege’s telescope example, we have the following principle: Some-thing is a mode of the presentation if there exists an object that realizes that mode of presentation. On the other hand, as we proceed in the article Frege talks about the cases of proper names that have sense without having a refer-ence and similarly sentences that express a thought without having a reference. Here we have the following principle: Sense as a mode of presentation is inde-pendent of reference. If a mode of presentation by definition requires the ex-istence of objects beforehand, the article inquires how one can say that the mode of presentation is also independent of object/reference. In the first part of the article, I will sketch the outlines of Frege’s theory within the scope of the central problem. In the second part, after briefly explaining the solution proposed by Evans and Beaney, I will attempt to criticize Beaney’s approach from a Fregean standpoint. Afterward, I will explain-without going too far away from Frege’s conceptual framework-how this problem could be solved and pro-vide my proposal up to the task.