Journals / İzmir İktisat Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 38 Sayı: 2

Nonlinear Effects of Ownership Concentration and Board Structure on Tobin’s Q in Banks

Bankalarda Sahiplikteki Yoğunlaşma ve Yönetim Kurulu Yapısının Tobin Q Üzerindeki Doğrusal Olmayan Etkileri

Pages
483–501
Publication Date
2023-06-05
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

When the financial structure of the bank was evaluated, it was determined that the increase in the bank's non-performing loan ratio decreased the bank's performance.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The performance of banks, which stand out with their financial intermediary role, varies depending on many factors and the importance of corporate governance practices has been emphasized in recent years.
📊
Key Findings & Data:The findings show that the performance levels of banks in the current period are positively affected by their previous performance levels.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:When the financial structure of the bank was evaluated, it was determined that the increase in the bank's non-performing loan ratio decreased the bank's performance.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Bankacılık · Yönetim Kurulu Ölçeği · Sistem GMM

Abstract

The performance of banks, which stand out with their financial intermediary role, varies depending on many factors and the importance of corporate governance practices has been emphasized in recent years. The findings show that the performance levels of banks in the current period are positively affected by their previous performance levels. The bank's performance is affected by its board of directors and ownership structure. The relationship between board scale and Tobin q is not linear. It has been determined that the relationship between the ownership right of the large shareholder and Tobin q in banks is not linear. The nonlinear relationship indicates the existence of an optimal level in terms of corporate governance practices. The increase in the ratio of independent and expert members in the board of directors affects the bank performance negatively. Also, it has been determined that the performance of the bank increases in case of duality in the board of directors of the bank. When the financial structure of the bank was evaluated, it was determined that the increase in the bank's non-performing loan ratio decreased the bank's performance.

Özet

Finansal aracı rolüyle ön plana çıkan bankalarda performans, birçok faktöre bağlı olarak değişmektedir ve son yıllarda kurumsal yönetim uygulamalarının önemine dikkat çekilmektedir. Bu çalışmada bankaların sahiplik yapısı, yönetim kurulunun özellikleri ve performans arasındaki ilişkiler gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki ticari bankalar açısından araştırılmıştır. Elde edilen bulgular, bankaların cari dönemdeki performans düzeylerinin bir dönem önceki performans düzeylerinden pozitif yönde etkilendiğini göstermiştir. Banka performansı, yönetim kurulu ve sahiplik yapısı bileşiminden etkilenmektedir. Yönetim kurulu ölçeği ile Tobin q arasındaki ilişki doğrusal değildir. Bankalarda büyük ortağın sahiplik hakkı ile Tobin q arasındaki ilişkisinin doğrusal olmadığı saptanmıştır. Doğrusal olmayan ilişki, kurumsal yönetim açısından optimal bir düzeyin varlığına işaret etmektedir. Yönetim kurulundaki bağımsız üye ve uzman üye oranlarının artması banka performansını negatif yönde etkilemektedir. Buna karşın, banka yönetim kurulunda ikilik olması halinde banka performansının arttığı belirlenmiştir. Bankanın finansal yapısı değerlendirildiğinde, bankanın takipteki kredi oranının artmasının banka performansını düşürdüğü saptanmıştır.

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Cite This Article

SIMÖES, E. B. (2023). Nonlinear Effects of Ownership Concentration and Board Structure on Tobin’s Q in Banks. İzmir İktisat Dergisi, Cilt: 38 Sayı: 2, 483–501. https://ajindex.com/articles/939935

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