Journals / Liberal Düşünce Dergisi / 2021 / Cilt: 26 Sayı: 101

Literature Framework on Judicialization of Politics

Siyasetin Yargısallaşması Üzerine Bir Literatür Değerlendirmesi

Pages
95–122
Publication Date
2021-03-25
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

While some consider constitutional control as a kind of hegemonic preservation of former power holders and/or state elites in the framework of distrust of politicians, others argue that constitutional justice is essential for the protection of individual rights and freedoms.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Judicialization of politics is a kind of political power through which judicial bodies have a control mechanism on legislative bodies.
📊
Key Findings & Data:It is political because, judicial bodies are established by politicians.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:While some consider constitutional control as a kind of hegemonic preservation of former power holders and/or state elites in the framework of distrust of politicians, others argue that constitutional justice is essential for the protection of individual rights and freedoms.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Siyasetin Yargısallaşması · Hegemonyanın Korunması · Bireysel Haklar

Abstract

Judicialization of politics is a kind of political power through which judicial bodies have a control mechanism on legislative bodies. It is political because, judicial bodies are established by politicians. This study analyses different theoretical approaches of judicialization of politics in respect of the relationship between high courts and politics, and establishment and/or conversion of the judiciary. The judicialization of politics has different aspects as it is closely related to politics and limiting excessive powers of legislative and executive. Judicial bodies, generally high courts have become important and powerful actors among executive, legislative, military, international actors, and NGOs through control power over important domestic and even some international affairs. While some consider constitutional control as a kind of hegemonic preservation of former power holders and/or state elites in the framework of distrust of politicians, others argue that constitutional justice is essential for the protection of individual rights and freedoms.

Özet

Siyasetin yargısallaşması yargı organlarının, yasama organları üzerinde kontrol mekanizması aracılığıyla, yasama organı üzerine siyasal bir etki yaratabilmesidir. Siyasaldır, çünkü siyaset tarafından oluşturulmakta ve siyasal kurumları kontrol edebilmektedir. Bu çalışma, yüksek mahkemeler ve siyaset arasındaki ilişkiyi, siyasetin yargısallaşması ile anayasal denetimin inşa edilmesi veya dönüştürülmesiyle ilgili farklı teorik yaklaşımları tartışmaktadır. Siyasetin yargısallaşması, yasama ve yürütme erklerini sınırlaması açısından siyasetle yakından ve doğrudan ilişkilidir. Genelde yargı, özelde de anayasa mahkemesi gibi yüksek mahkemeler, önemli birtakım ulusal hatta uluslararası konulardaki denetim yetkileriyle yasama, yürütme, silahlı kuvvetler, uluslararası aktörler, STK’lar arasında başat bir aktör haline gelmiştir. Tüm demokrasilerde kuvvetler ayrılığının en önemli göstergelerinden biri olarak anayasal denetimi bazıları, siyasilere duyulan güvensizlik çerçevesinde, eski iktidar sahiplerinin ve/veya devlet elitlerinin bir tür hegemonik koruyucusu olarak değerlendirirken, bazıları ise anayasa yargısının bireysel haklar ve özgürlüklerin korunması için olmazsa olmaz olduğunu öne sürmektedir.

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Cite This Article

ERDAL, M. (2021). Literature Framework on Judicialization of Politics. Liberal Düşünce Dergisi, Cilt: 26 Sayı: 101, 95–122. https://ajindex.com/articles/936617

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