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Journals / İzmir İktisat Dergisi / 2020 / Cilt: 35 - Sayı: 3

Political Economy of Development and Contributions of Acemoğlu

Gelişmenin Politik İktisadı ve Acemoğlu’nun Katkıları

Harun BAL
Pınar ÇUHADAR
Pages
481–493
Publication Date
2020-09-30
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Aim of this study is to draw a frame of Acemoğlu’s contributions to political economy of development and institutional economics’ theory.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Institution as an interdisciplinary concept which is used in a vast range of social sciences has a great importance with its impact on social conflict and power distribution in economics literature nowadays.
📊
Key Findings & Data:That the human behaviors are designed by institutions is becoming a well-accepted idea day by day, therefore it is the same to accept the functions of institutions in economics and social process; its power on determining the losers and winners of society through public policy.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:Aim of this study is to draw a frame of Acemoğlu’s contributions to political economy of development and institutional economics’ theory.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Kurumlar · toplumsal çatışma · güç

Abstract

Institution as an interdisciplinary concept which is used in a vast range of social sciences has a great importance with its impact on social conflict and power distribution in economics literature nowadays. That the human behaviors are designed by institutions is becoming a well-accepted idea day by day, therefore it is the same to accept the functions of institutions in economics and social process; its power on determining the losers and winners of society through public policy. Several theories are constructed for understanding the relations between institutions and development level. Daron Acemoğlu is one of the economists who have important contributions to the institutional theory. Aim of this study is to draw a frame of Acemoğlu’s contributions to political economy of development and institutional economics’ theory.

Özet

Sosyal bilimlerin birçok alanında kullanılan, disiplinlerarası bir kavram olan kurumlar, toplumsal çatışma ve güç dağılımı üzerindeki etkisi ile iktisat yazınında önemli bir yer tutmaya başlamıştır. İnsan davranışları üzerindeki etkisi her geçen gün daha fazla kabul gören kurumlar, iktisadi ve siyasi olarak sistemin işleyişini, sistemin kazanan ve kaybedenlerini kamu politikaları aracılığı ile belirleme gücüne sahiptir. Kurumların gelişmişlik düzeyi üzerindeki etkisini ele alan birçok kuram geliştirilmiştir. Kurumlar literatürüne bu anlamda katkı sunan önemli isimlerden biri de Daron Acemoğlu’dur. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Acemoğlu’nun gelişmenin politik iktisadı ve kurumsal iktisat teorisine yaptığı katkıların bir çerçevesini çizmektir

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Cite This Article

BAL, H., ÇUHADAR, P. (2020). Political Economy of Development and Contributions of Acemoğlu. İzmir İktisat Dergisi, Cilt: 35 - Sayı: 3, 481–493. https://ajindex.com/articles/88405

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