Journals / EMO Bilimsel Dergi / 2023 / Cilt: 13 - Sayı: 1

Impact of S-box Size on Results of Correlation Power Analysis

S-kutusu Büyüklüğünün Korelasyon Güç Analizi Sonuçlarına Etkisi

Pages
31–39
Publication Date
2023-01-23
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

On the other hand, applying CPA, with the same measurement setup, to PRESENT in which the S-boxes are replaced with the AES S-box of size 8x8, we show that, parallel to the increase in power consumption, the noise effect is lesser and it is easier to find the correct key.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Use of small S-boxes in a symmetric crypto-system reduces power consumption of its embedded hardware.
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Key Findings & Data:It is known that this increases the adverse effect of noise on the results of side channel analysis (SCA).
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Conclusion & Impact:On the other hand, applying CPA, with the same measurement setup, to PRESENT in which the S-boxes are replaced with the AES S-box of size 8x8, we show that, parallel to the increase in power consumption, the noise effect is lesser and it is easier to find the correct key.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:PRESENT · S-kutusu · SAKURA-X

Abstract

Use of small S-boxes in a symmetric crypto-system reduces power consumption of its embedded hardware. It is known that this increases the adverse effect of noise on the results of side channel analysis (SCA). Here, to verify the mentioned effect experimentally, the lightweight block cipher PRESENT having 4x4 S-boxes is implemented on the cryptographic hardware SAKURA-X and correlation power analysis (CPA), one of the most powerful methods of SCA, is realized. Consequently, we find that the noise occurring within the power traces obtained by our measurement setup makes it difficult to identify the correct key. Further, when we apply CPA to PRESENT by simulating the noisy power traces, we get the correct key successfully. On the other hand, applying CPA, with the same measurement setup, to PRESENT in which the S-boxes are replaced with the AES S-box of size 8x8, we show that, parallel to the increase in power consumption, the noise effect is lesser and it is easier to find the correct key.

Özet

Simetrik bir kripto-sistemde küçük S-kutularının kullanımı, gömüldüğü donanımın güç tüketimini azaltmaktadır. Bu durumun yan kanal analizi (YKA) sonuçlarında gürültünün bozucu etkisini arttırdığı bilinmektedir. Bu çalışmamızda, bahsedilen etkiyi deneysel olarak doğrulamak için, 4x4 S-kutularına sahip hafif sıklet blok şifreleme algoritması PRESENT, SAKURA-X kriptografik donanımı üzerinde gerçeklenmiş ve en etkili YKA yöntemlerinden olan korelasyon güç analizi (KGA) yapılmıştır. Bunun sonucunda, ölçüm düzeneğimiz vasıtasıyla alınan güç ölçümlerinde oluşan gürültünün doğru anahtar tespitini zorlaştırdığı görülmüştür. Ayrıca, PRESENT için gürültülü güç ölçümlerinin benzetimi ile KGA yürütüldüğünde, doğru anahtarın başarılı bir şekilde elde edildiği gözlenmiştir. Diğer taraftan, S-kutuları 8x8 AES S-kutusu ile değiştirilmiş PRESENT için aynı ölçüm düzeneğiyle KGA uyguladığımızda, güç tüketimi artışına paralel olarak, gürültü etkisinin daha az olduğu ve doğru anahtarın daha kolay elde edildiği gösterilmiştir.

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Cite This Article

KAVUT, S., YARGICI, Y. R. (2023). Impact of S-box Size on Results of Correlation Power Analysis. EMO Bilimsel Dergi, Cilt: 13 - Sayı: 1, 31–39. https://ajindex.com/articles/878505

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