Journals / Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / 2016 / 2016

Against McGinn’s Mysterianism

Pages
1–10
Publication Date
2016-01-31
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem.
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Key Findings & Data:I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other.
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Conclusion & Impact:However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Colin McGinn · Gizemcilik · zihin-beden problemi

Abstract

There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted.

Özet

McGinn’in gizemcilik adı verilen görüşü açısından iki iddia merkezi önemdedir: (1) zihin-beden probleminin doğalcı ve yapıcı bir çözümü vardır ve (2) insanlar zihin-beden problemini ilkesel olarak çözemezler. (1) ve (2), çelişik iki tez değildir: birinin doğruluğu diğerinin yanlış olmasını gerektirmez. Fakat savunacağım iddia odur ki, McGinn’in (2)’nin doğruluğuna dair verdiği gerekçeler (1)’in doğruluğu ile – McGinn’in kendisinin de varsaydığı, ‘doğalcı’ ve ‘yapıcı’ terimlerinin standart yorumlarını hesaba kattığımızda – çelişik durumdadır.

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Cite This Article

DEMİRCİOĞLU, E. (2016). Against McGinn’s Mysterianism. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, 2016, 1–10. https://ajindex.com/articles/68598

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References (2)

  1. Demircioglu, E. (2015). The puzzle of consciousness. Cilicia Journal of Philosophy, 2, 76-85.
  2. McGinn, C. (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind, 98 (391), 349-366.