Journals / İnönü Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi / 2016 / Cilt: 7 - Sayı: 1

BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A Legal and Institutional Study

BRICS Koşullu İhtiyat-Fonu Düzenlemesi: Hukuksal ve Kurumsal İnceleme

Pages
295–350
Publication Date
2022-10-18
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The study examines the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement as one of the building blocks of a ‘new international financial architecture’ as forming against the Bretton Woods model of legal regulation and institutional governance in international financial law.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The aftermath of the Second World War marked the establishment of the Bretton Woods system as the legal and institutional framework of the international monetary/financial order, swith a view to avoiding the repetation of the Great Depression of 1929.
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Key Findings & Data:Despite the collapse of the system in 1973, its institutions, IMF and World Bank continued to shape the international financial system by pursuing macroeconomic policies based on neoliberal capitalism.
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Conclusion & Impact:The study examines the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement as one of the building blocks of a ‘new international financial architecture’ as forming against the Bretton Woods model of legal regulation and institutional governance in international financial law.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Bretton Woods · IMF · uluslararası para/finans hukuku

Abstract

The aftermath of the Second World War marked the establishment of the Bretton Woods system as the legal and institutional framework of the international monetary/financial order, swith a view to avoiding the repetation of the Great Depression of 1929. Despite the collapse of the system in 1973, its institutions, IMF and World Bank continued to shape the international financial system by pursuing macroeconomic policies based on neoliberal capitalism. As a result, liberalisation of capital markets led to financial globalisation, thereby causing global financial crises. BRICS has emerged in part as a reaction to the existing global monetary/financial governance and its failure in crisis prevention, management and resolution mostly in emerging market economies and developing countries. The study examines the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement as one of the building blocks of a ‘new international financial architecture’ as forming against the Bretton Woods model of legal regulation and institutional governance in international financial law.

Özet

1929 Büyük Ekonomik Buhranın yarattığı mali krizin bir daha yaşanmaması için İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonunda Bretton Woods sistemi bir uluslararası para/finans hukuku rejimi yaratmak üzere kurulmuştur. 1973’de sistemin çökmesine rağmen, uluslararası mali düzen Bretton Woods kurumları IMF ve Dünya Bankasının neoliberal kapitalist makroekonomik politikaları ile şekillenmeye devam etmiştir. Sermaye piyasalarının liberalleşmesi dünya ekonomisinde finansal küreselleşmeye yol açmıştır. BRICS yükselen piyasa ekonomileri ve gelişmekte olan devletlerde ortaya çıkan küresel finans krizlerine bir tepki olarak global ekonomik idarenin değiştirilmesi ihtiyacıyla ortaya çıkmıştır. BRICS Koşullu İhtiyat Fonu Düzenlemesi, Bretton Woods modeline karşı, yeni uluslararası finansal mimarinin yapı taşlarındandır.

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Cite This Article

ERDEM, M. (2022). BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A Legal and Institutional Study. İnönü Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 7 - Sayı: 1, 295–350. https://ajindex.com/articles/547932

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