Journals / Ege Akademik Bakış / 2014 / Cilt: 14 - Sayı: 3

Majone’s theorization of the European Union as a regulatory state and its implications for the debates over democracy in the European Union

Majone’nin “düzenleyici Avrupa Devleti” modeli ve Avrupa Birliği’nde demokrasi açığı tartışmalarına etkisi

Pages
399–412
Publication Date
2022-10-12
DOI
—
🏛️Bibliographic metadata and full text access for this article are provided via DergiPark.
DergiPark Record ↗
✨

AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In this article whether democracy is or should achievable in the Union will be examined in the light of conception of “European regulatory state” which has become one of the salient issues in European politics after Giandomenico Majone theorized the European Union as a regulatory state.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The Euro area debt crisis has made the on-going debates over the extent to which the European Union is democratic more heated.
📊
Key Findings & Data:Some scholars argue that the European Union becomes less democratic, in other words the democratic deficit in the European Union widens due to initiatives taken to cope with the effects of the Euro area debt crisis.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:In this article whether democracy is or should achievable in the Union will be examined in the light of conception of “European regulatory state” which has become one of the salient issues in European politics after Giandomenico Majone theorized the European Union as a regulatory state.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

The Euro area debt crisis has made the on-going debates over the extent to which the European Union is democratic more heated. Some scholars argue that the European Union becomes less democratic, in other words the democratic deficit in the European Union widens due to initiatives taken to cope with the effects of the Euro area debt crisis. Nonetheless, before coming to conclusion whether the Euro area debt crisis has implications on the democracy at the European Union level, finding out whether democracy is or should be achievable in the Union should be discussed. In this article whether democracy is or should achievable in the Union will be examined in the light of conception of “European regulatory state” which has become one of the salient issues in European politics after Giandomenico Majone theorized the European Union as a regulatory state.

Özet

Avro alanında yaşanan borç krizinin etkisiyle, Avrupa Birliği yönetim sisteminin ne kadar demokratik olduğu üzerine süregelen tartışmalar yoğunlaşmıştır. Zira Avro alanı borç krizinin etkileriyle mücadele amacıyla alınan önlemler nedeniyle Avrupa Birliği’nin daha az demokratik hale geldiği, bir başka deyişle Birliğin demokrasi açığının genişlediği yönündeki argümanlar ileri sürülmektedir. Aslında Avro alanı borç krizinin supranasyonel düzeyde demokrasiyi etkileyip etkilemediği hususunda kesin bir kanıya varmadan önce, supranasyonel düzeyde demokrasinin uygulanıp uygulanamayacağını ya da supranasyonel düzeyde demokrasinin bir gereklilik olup olmadığı tartışılmalıdır. Bu makalenin amacı da anılan sorulara, Giandomenico Majone’nin “düzenleyici Avrupa devleti” modeli kapsamında yanıt aramaktır.

🔖

Cite This Article

YİĞİT, D. (2022). Majone’s theorization of the European Union as a regulatory state and its implications for the debates over democracy in the European Union. Ege Akademik Bakış, Cilt: 14 - Sayı: 3, 399–412. https://ajindex.com/articles/495342

📄 Full Text PDF Viewer

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...

References (14)

  1. Bach, D. ve Newman, A., L. (2007) “The European Regulatory State And Global Public Policy: Micro- Institutions, Macro-ınfluence” Journal of European Public Policy, 14(6):827-846.
  2. Bellamy, R. (2006) “Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation, and Democracy in the EU” European Law Journal, 12(6):725-742.
  3. Caporaso, J. (1996) “The European Union and Forms of State:Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern?” Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(1):29-52.
  4. Coen, D. ve Thatcher, M. (2005) “The New Governance of Markets and Non-Majoritarian Regulators” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 18(3):329-346.
  5. Coen, D. ve Thatcher, M. (2008) “Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory Agencies” Journal of Public Policy, 28(1):49-71.
  6. Crouch, C. ve Streeck, W. (1997) Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity, Londra, Sage Publications. Dehousse, R. (1997) “Regulation by Networks in the European Community:the Role of European agencies” Journal of European Public Policy, 4(2):246-261.
  7. Dehousse, R. (1998) European Institutional Architecture after Amsterdam: Parliamentary System or Regulatory Structure? European University Institute, Working Paper RSC No: 98/11. Dehousse, R. (2003) “Comitology: Who Watches The Watcmen?” Journal of European Public Policy, 10(5):798-813.
  8. Dehousse, R. (2008) “Delegation of Powers in the European Union:The Need for a Multi-principals Model” West European Politics, 31(4):789-805.
  9. Eberlein, B. ve Grande, E. (2005) “Beyond Delegation: Transnational Regulatory Regimes And the EU Regulatory State” Journal of European Public Policy, 12(1):89-112.
  10. Franchino, F. (2002) “Efficiency or Credibility?Testing The two Logics of Delegation to the European Commission” Journal of European Public Policy, 9(5):677-694.
  11. Follesdal, A. ve Hix, S. (2006) “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik,” European Governance Paper (EUROGOV) No.C-05-02, http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/ pdf/egp-connex-C-05-02.pdf., (10.01.2010).
  12. Gilardi, F. (2008)
  13. Delegation in the Regulatory State, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Gilardi, F. (2002) “Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies; A Comparative Empirical Analysis” Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6):873-893.
  14. Gilardi, F. (2007) “The Same, but Different: Central Banks, Regulatory Agencies, and the Politics of Delegation to Independent Authorities”