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Journals / Ege Akademik Bakış / 2018 / Cilt: 18 - Sayı: 2

Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach

Oyun Teorisi Yaklaşımı ile Kurumlar Vergisi Ödemeleri

Can MAVRUK
Ersin KIRAL
Pages
195–216
Publication Date
2022-10-12
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The results demonstratethat: (1) the solution set of zero sum game is linearand that of variable sum game is trapezoidal; (2)Grim-trigger and Tit-for-tat of defection both arenot appropriate strategies; (3) in pure and mixedstrategy equilibrium, TRA needs high audit rates inorder to force CTP to point of indifference; (4) CTPwill prefer evading tax indefinitely and if possiblerequest settlement when get caught for evadingtax; and (5) the number of qualified tax inspectorsand audit rates must be increased to break thecourage of CTP evading tax.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This article investigates corporate tax payoffs in arepeated game theory approach.
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Key Findings & Data:An applicationof mixed strategy infinitely repeated game forcorporate tax payoffs is provided with four paymenttypes included under new draft tax procedural law.The Folk Theorem is used to find SPNE of infinitelyrepeated game strategies.
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Conclusion & Impact:The results demonstratethat: (1) the solution set of zero sum game is linearand that of variable sum game is trapezoidal; (2)Grim-trigger and Tit-for-tat of defection both arenot appropriate strategies; (3) in pure and mixedstrategy equilibrium, TRA needs high audit rates inorder to force CTP to point of indifference; (4) CTPwill prefer evading tax indefinitely and if possiblerequest settlement when get caught for evadingtax; and (5) the number of qualified tax inspectorsand audit rates must be increased to break thecourage of CTP evading tax.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

This article investigates corporate tax payoffs in arepeated game theory approach. An applicationof mixed strategy infinitely repeated game forcorporate tax payoffs is provided with four paymenttypes included under new draft tax procedural law.The Folk Theorem is used to find SPNE of infinitelyrepeated game strategies. The results demonstratethat: (1) the solution set of zero sum game is linearand that of variable sum game is trapezoidal; (2)Grim-trigger and Tit-for-tat of defection both arenot appropriate strategies; (3) in pure and mixedstrategy equilibrium, TRA needs high audit rates inorder to force CTP to point of indifference; (4) CTPwill prefer evading tax indefinitely and if possiblerequest settlement when get caught for evadingtax; and (5) the number of qualified tax inspectorsand audit rates must be increased to break thecourage of CTP evading tax.

Özet

Bu makale tekrarlanan oyun teorisi yaklaşımı ile kurumlar vergisi ödemelerini araştırmaktadır. Kurumlar vergisi mükellefleri için bir karma strateji sonsuz tekrarlı oyun uygulaması, yeni taslak vergi usulü kanunu kapsamında yer alan dört ödeme türüne göre verilmiştir. Folk Teoremi, sonsuz tekrarlanan oyun stratejilerinin alt oyun tam Nash dengesini bulmak için kullanılmıştır. Sonuçlar gösteriyor ki: (1) sıfır toplamlı oyunun çözüm kümesi doğrusaldır ve değişken toplamlı oyununun çözüm kümesi çeşit kenar dörtgendir; (2) acımasız-tetik ve kısasa-kısasta aksiyon değiştirme uygun stratejiler değildir; (3) saf ve karma strateji dengesinde, vergi idaresinin mükellefi kayıtsızlık noktasına zorlayabilmesi için yüksek denetim oranlarına ihtiyacı vardır; (4) Kurumlar vergisi mükellefi, süresiz vergi kaçırmayı tercih eder ve eğer mümkünse, vergi kaçırmak için yakalandığında, uzlaşma talebinde bulunur; ve (5) Kurumlar vergisi mükellefinin vergi kaçırma cesaretini kırmak için nitelikli vergi müfettişlerinin ve denetim oranlarının artırılması gerekmektedir.

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Cite This Article

MAVRUK, C., KIRAL, E. (2022). Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach. Ege Akademik Bakış, Cilt: 18 - Sayı: 2, 195–216. https://ajindex.com/articles/495208

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