SavedAdd your journal

Journals / Ege Akademik Bakış / 2019 / Cilt: 19 - Sayı: 1

Converse Tournaments

Ters Turnuvalar

Kerim KESKİN
Pages
33–43
Publication Date
2022-10-12
DOI
—
🏛️Bibliographic metadata and full text access for this article are provided via DergiPark.
DergiPark Record ↗
✨

AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

We characterize the unique subgameperfect Nash equilibrium in both models andcompare the equilibrium strategies with those inthe original model.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark andRiis (1998b)’s sequential model of nested multipleprize contests.
📊
Key Findings & Data:First, we consider winning prizesendogenously determined by exerted contestefforts.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:We characterize the unique subgameperfect Nash equilibrium in both models andcompare the equilibrium strategies with those inthe original model.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark andRiis (1998b)’s sequential model of nested multipleprize contests. First, we consider winning prizesendogenously determined by exerted contestefforts. Second, we extend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgameperfect Nash equilibrium in both models andcompare the equilibrium strategies with those inthe original model.

Özet

Bu makalede Clark ve Riis (1998b)’in iç içe geçmiş çoködüllü yarışma modelinin dinamik versiyonuna iki alternatif önerilmiştir. İlk olarak, kazananların alacağı ödüllerin sarf edilen yarışma eforları tarafından endojen olarak belirlendiği bir model çalışılmıştır. İkinci olarak, model genişletilerek bir sonsuz ufuk modeli elde edilmiştir. Önerilen modellerin alt-oyun mükemmel Nash dengeleri karakterize edilmiş olup, ilgili denge stratejileri temel alınan modeldeki denge stratejileri ile karşılaştırılmıştır.

🔖

Cite This Article

KESKİN, K. (2022). Converse Tournaments. Ege Akademik Bakış, Cilt: 19 - Sayı: 1, 33–43. https://ajindex.com/articles/495152

📄 Full Text PDF Viewer

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...

References (20)

  1. Barut, Y. and Kovenock, D. (1998) “The Symmetric Multiple Prize All-pay Auction with Complete Information”. European Journal of Political Economy, 14: 627–644.
  2. Berry, S. (1993) “Rent-seeking with Multiple Winners”. Public Choice, 77: 437–443.
  3. Brown, A. and Chowdhury, S. (2017) “The Hidden Perils of Affirmative Action: Sabotage in Handicap Contests”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 133: 273–284.
  4. Cahuc, P., Postel-Vinay, F., and Robin, J.-M. (2006) “Wage Bargaining with On-the-job Search: Theory and Evidence”. Econometrica, 74: 323–364.
  5. Chowdhury, S., Jeon, J., and Ramalingam A. (2018) “Property Rights and Loss Aversion in Contests”. Economic Inquiry, 56: 1492–1511.
  6. Chowdhury, S. and Kim, S.-H. (2014) “A Note on Multi-winner Contest Mechanisms”. Economics Letters, 125: 357–359.
  7. Clark, D. and Riis, C. (1996) “A Multi-winner Nested Rent-seeking Contest”. Public Choice, 87: 177–184.
  8. Clark, D. and Riis, C. (1998a) “Competition over More than One Prize”. American Economic Review, 88: 276–289.
  9. Clark, D. and Riis, C. (1998b) “Influence and the Discretionary Allocation of Several Prizes”. European Journal of Political Economy, 14: 605–625. Corchón, L. C. (2007) “The Theory of Contests: A Survey”. Review of Economic Design, 11: 69–100.
  10. Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., and Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) “A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-pay Auctions and Tournaments”. Experimental Economics, 18: 609–669.
  11. Dixit, A. (1987) “Strategic Behavior in Contests”. American Economic Review, 77: 891–898.
  12. Doğan, S., Karagözoğlu, E., Keskin, K., and Sağlam, Ç. (2018) “Multi-player Race”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 149: 123–136.
  13. Dye, R. A. (1984) “The Trouble with Tournaments”. Economic Inquiry, 22: 147–149.
  14. Fu, Q., Lu, J., and Pan, Y. (2015) “Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles”. American Economic Review, 105: 2120–2140.
  15. Fu, Q., Lu, J., and Wang, Z. (2014) “‘Reverse’ Nested Lottery Contests”. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 50: 128–140.
  16. Jovanovic, B. (1984) “Matching, Turnover, and Unemployment”. Journal of Political Economy, 92: 108–122.
  17. Keskin, K. and Sağlam, Ç. (2017, Forthcoming) “A Territorial Conflict: Trade-offs and Strategies”. Defence and Peace Economics. Konrad, K. A. (2009)
  18. Strategy and Dynamics in Contests, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.
  19. Konrad, K. A. and Kovenock, D. (2009) “Multi-battle Contests”. Games and Economic Behavior, 66: 256–274.
  20. Lazear, E. P. and Rosen, S. (1981) “Rank-order Tournaments as Optimum La