Journals / Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi / 2021 / Cilt: 23 - Sayı: 1

MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SELECTIVITY CRITERION IN STATE AID CASES

DEVLET TEŞVİKLERİ SORUŞTURMALARINDA ÇOK ULUSLU ŞİRKETLER VE SEÇİCİLİK KRİTERİ

Pages
793–821
Publication Date
2022-10-11
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The fourth section will question the legal basis put forward by the Commission to implement arm’s length principle.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:cisions of the European Union Commission regarding taxation agreements between competent tax authorities and multinational enterprises have been widely discussed.
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Key Findings & Data:Within this perspective, the first section will elaborate on the application of the selectivity criterion in cases concerning taxation practices of multinational enterprises.
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Conclusion & Impact:The fourth section will question the legal basis put forward by the Commission to implement arm’s length principle.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

cisions of the European Union Commission regarding taxation agreements between competent tax authorities and multinational enterprises have been widely discussed. Within this discussion, implementation of the selectivity criterion and specifically the arm’s length principle, which is accepted by the Commission as a necessity in the application of state aid rules, has received a lot of criticism. This study will focus on the assessments on selectivity criterion in the decisions regarding multinational enterprises. Within this perspective, the first section will elaborate on the application of the selectivity criterion in cases concerning taxation practices of multinational enterprises. The second section will question the application of presumption of selectivity in case of advanced pricing agreements. The third section will discuss whether multinational enterprises and standalones are in a comparable legal and factual situation. The fourth section will question the legal basis put forward by the Commission to implement arm’s length principle.

Özet

Yetkili vergi otoriteleri ile çok uluslu şirketler arasındaki vergi anlaşmalarına dair Avrupa Birliği Komisyonu kararları oldukça fazla tartışılmıştır. Bu tartışmalar çerçevesinde, seçicilik kriteri ve özellikle Komisyon’un devlet teşvikleri kurallarının uygulanması için gereklilik olarak gördüğü emsallere uygunluk ilkesi çok sayıda eleştiriye tabi tutulmuştur. Bu çalışma, çok uluslu şirketlere dair hükmedilen kararlarda seçicilik kriterinin nasıl ele alındığı üzerine yoğunlaşacaktır. Bu kapsamda ilk bölümde, çok uluslu şirketlerin vergi uygulamalarını konu edinen kararlarda seçicilik ilkesinin nasıl uygulandığı ele alınacaktır. İkinci bölümde peşin fiyat anlaşmalarının varlığında uygulanan seçicilik karinesi üzerine tartışılacaktır. Üçüncü bölümde, çok uluslu şirketler ile bağımsız şirketlerin hukuki ve fiili olarak karşılaştırılabilir olup olmadıkları sorgulanacaktır. Dördüncü bölümde ise, Komisyon’un emsallere uygunluk ilkesini uygulamak için öne sürdüğü hukuki dayanakların geçerliliği sorgulanacaktır.

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Cite This Article

ÖZKARDEŞ, N. (2022). MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SELECTIVITY CRITERION IN STATE AID CASES. Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 23 - Sayı: 1, 793–821. https://ajindex.com/articles/490469

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References (11)

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