Journals / Akademik Hassasiyetler / 2019 / Cilt: 6 - Sayı: 12

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

HUKUK VE İKTİSAT PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ANAYASA MAHKEMELERİNİN İKTİSADİ ANALİZİ*

Pages
61–93
Publication Date
2022-10-12
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The economic analysis of the constitutional courts is still open to development, as it requires an interdisciplinary effort, and institutional approach differs in every country.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:Both the security of private property and contracts that are guaranteed by the constitution are not always provided because of rent-seeking and logrolling.
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Key Findings & Data:Thus, the production and investment capacity of the economies increase, and the financial markets expand.
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Conclusion & Impact:The economic analysis of the constitutional courts is still open to development, as it requires an interdisciplinary effort, and institutional approach differs in every country.
🔬Design:Review & Systematic Survey
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Both the security of private property and contracts that are guaranteed by the constitution are not always provided because of rent-seeking and logrolling. Therefore, the legal norms that are exercised and enforced by legislative and executive powers must be subject to the constitutional review carried out by the constitutional courts. This review provides a stable and predictable environment for the agents to the extent that the court is independent. Thus, the production and investment capacity of the economies increase, and the financial markets expand. However, the degree of independence of the constitutional court varies according to certain factors. The most important reasons are followings: The court produces politic outcomes depending on the political nature of the constitution. Judges have the freedom to interpret the constitution. The abstract review can be a scene of conflict among powers. Finally, court judges are appointed by politic actors. These allow the judge's voting behavior to be explained by the strategic approach. In the literature, there exist papers that confirm this approach. However, analyses should be country-specific due to their differences in the legal systems and structures. This study aims to explain how the economic analysis of constitutional courts is carried out within the scope of Law and Economics discipline by presenting the relevant theory and empirical studies. We take the historical development path of the discipline into consideration as the method, therefore theoretical background is explained at first, and then the empirical studies are demonstrated. The economic analysis of the constitutional courts is still open to development, as it requires an interdisciplinary effort, and institutional approach differs in every country.

Özet

Anayasa ile teminat altına alınan özel mülkiyet güvenliği ve sözleşmegüvenliği, rant kollama ve siyasi yandaşlık gibi nedenlerden dolayı her zamansağlanamamaktadır. Bu nedenle yasama ve yürütme erklerinin yaptığı ve uyguladığıhukuki normlar anayasa mahkemesinin anayasallık denetimine tabi olmalıdır. Budenetim bağımsız olduğu ölçüde iktisadi birimlere istikrarlı ve öngörülebilir birortam temin etmektedir. Böylece ekonomilerin üretim ve yatırım hacmi artmakta,finans piyasaları genişlemektedir. Ancak anayasa mahkemesinin bağımsızlıkderecesi çeşitli etkenlere göre değişiklik göstermektedir. Bunun en önemli nedenleri:mahkemenin, anayasanın siyasi bir metin olmasından dolayı siyasi çıktılar üretmesi,hâkimlerin karar verirken yorum yapabilmeleri, iptal davalarının erkler arasıçatışmalara sahne olması ve mahkeme üyelerinin siyasi aktörler tarafındanatanmasıdır. Bahsedilen nedenler, hâkimlerin oy davranışlarının stratejik yaklaşımile açıklanabilmesine olanak tanımaktadır. Literatürde yapılan çeşitli çalışmalar busonucu doğrulamakla beraber ülkelerin hukuk sistemlerinin ve kurumsalyapılanmalarının farklı olması, ülkelere özgü analizlerin yapılmasını gereklikılmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Hukuk ve İktisat disiplini kapsamında, anayasamahkemelerinin iktisadi analizinin nasıl gerçekleştirildiğini ilgili teoriyi ve ampirikçalışmaları göstererek açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Yöntem olarak; disiplinintarihsel gelişim patikası dikkate alınarak önce teorik ilerlemelerin, devamında iseuygulamalı çalışmaların verilmesi benimsenmektedir. Anayasa mahkemelerininiktisadi analizi, hem disiplinlerarası bir çalışma yöntemini gerekli kılması, hem dekurumsal yapıların ülkeden ülkeye farklılık göstermesi nedeniyle hala gelişime açıkbir çalışma alanı olma özelliği taşımaktadır.

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Cite This Article

PİŞKİN, A. (2022). ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. Akademik Hassasiyetler, Cilt: 6 - Sayı: 12, 61–93. https://ajindex.com/articles/432928

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