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Journals / Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi / 2021 / Cilt: 23 - Sayı: 1

AXIO-SYSTEMIC VALIDITY: POSITIVISM WITH REASON

Yahya Berkol GÜLGEÇ
Pages
517–569
Publication Date
2021-05-24
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Therefore, it can be conceived of as a positivist understanding of validity

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Systemic validity is generally in conformity with the understanding of validity adopted by legal officials.
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Key Findings & Data:On the other hand, it suffers from an inability to account for why an enactment in conformity with the systemic criteria constitutes a norm.
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Conclusion & Impact:Therefore, it can be conceived of as a positivist understanding of validity
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Systemic validity · Axiological validity · Legal positivism

Özet

Systemic validity is generally in conformity with the understanding of validity adopted by legal officials. On the other hand, it suffers from an inability to account for why an enactment in conformity with the systemic criteria constitutes a norm. Axio-systemic validity aims to compensate this deficiency by introducing a hybrid understanding of validity. While the systemic component continues the descriptive and explanatory advantages, the minimum axiological element guarantees that the enactments possess the character of norms. While axio-systemic validity violates the social fact and sources theses, it is compatible with the separability thesis. Therefore, it can be conceived of as a positivist understanding of validity

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Cite This Article

GÜLGEÇ, Y. B. (2021). AXIO-SYSTEMIC VALIDITY: POSITIVISM WITH REASON. Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 23 - Sayı: 1, 517–569. https://ajindex.com/articles/416050

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