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Journals / TİSK Akademi / 2012 / Cilt: 7 - Sayı: 13

The strategic interaction between monetary policy and wage bargainers

Para politikası ve ücret pazarlıkçıları arasındaki stratejik etkileşim

ASLI GÜLER
Hasan ÖZYURT
Pages
130–163
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

JEL Classification: E24, E31, E52, E58

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The politico-economic regulation of unemployment and inflation depends on the institutional network in which monetary policy makers and wage bargainers interact.
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Key Findings & Data:Central bank’s independence and coordination of wage bargaining interact with each other in setting of unemployment and inflation level.
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Conclusion & Impact:JEL Classification: E24, E31, E52, E58
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

The politico-economic regulation of unemployment and inflation depends on the institutional network in which monetary policy makers and wage bargainers interact. Central bank’s independence and coordination of wage bargaining interact with each other in setting of unemployment and inflation level. Central bank independence has real effects, even given fully rational expectations. The real effects of a central bank’s conservatism hinge not only on the credibility of that conservatism, but also upon institutional structure of wage bargaining and the incentives and capacity of wage bargainers to coordinate their behavior on optimal stance. The main aim of this study is to show how those actors interact, what level of information and capability they have and the possible outcomes that may appear as a result of their interactions. JEL Classification: E24, E31, E52, E58

Özet

Enflasyon ve işsizliğin politik-ekonomik düzenlemesi, para politikası yapıcıları ile ücret pazarlıkçılarının etkileşim içinde oldukları kurumsal ağa bağlıdır. Merkez bankası bağımsızlığı ile ücret pazarlığı koordinasyonu, işsizlik ve enflasyon seviyesinin belirlenmesinde birbirleriyle etkileşim içindedirler. Merkez bankası bağımsızlığı, rasyonel beklentilerin geçerli olduğu bir ekonomik düzende reel etkiler meydana getirebilmektedir. Bu reel etkilerin ortaya çıkabilmesi, sadece merkez bankasının muhafazakarlık derecesine değil, aynı zamanda ücret pazarlığının kurumsal yapısına ve ücret pazarlıkçılarının optimal davranış üzerinde koordine olabilme dürtü ve yeteneklerine bağlıdır. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, bu aktörlerin nasıl etkileştiklerini, enformasyon ve yetenek düzeylerinin ne olduğunu ve etkileşimleri sonucu ortaya çıkabilecek muhtemel sonuçları göstermektir. JEL Sınıflaması: E24, E31, E52, E58

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Cite This Article

GÜLER, A., ÖZYURT, H. (2012). The strategic interaction between monetary policy and wage bargainers. TİSK Akademi, Cilt: 7 - Sayı: 13, 130–163. https://ajindex.com/articles/364605

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