Journals / Öneri Dergisi / 2016 / Cilt: 12 - Sayı: 45

THE ROLE OF AGENCY COSTS IN EXPLAINING FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON SELECTED PUBLIC FIRMS IN BRIC COUNTRIES

VEKÂLET MALİYETLERİNİN FİNANSAL PERFORMANS FARKLILIKLARINI AÇIKLAMADAKİ ROLÜ: BRIC ÜLKELERİNDE FAALİYET GÖSTEREN SEÇİLMİŞ HALKA AÇIK FİRMALAR ÜZERİNE AMPİRİK BİR ÇALIŞMA

Pages
187–210
Publication Date
2016-02-13
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The findings based on panel data analysis are considered to provide useful insight upon an additional explanation to the presence of financial performance differences among the firms other than simply firm-specific attributes and emphasize the importance of finding mechanisms for alleviating agency costs to attain the overall goal of share- holder wealth maximization.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:The consequences of the recent corporate scandals have directed the attention of corporations towards the opportunistic behaviors of managers; thus, evaluation of agency costs encountered within the firm.
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Key Findings & Data:The divergence of interest between the managers and shareholders has a potential to con- stitute a threat to the firms’ financial performance.
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Conclusion & Impact:The findings based on panel data analysis are considered to provide useful insight upon an additional explanation to the presence of financial performance differences among the firms other than simply firm-specific attributes and emphasize the importance of finding mechanisms for alleviating agency costs to attain the overall goal of share- holder wealth maximization.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2003 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Vekalet Maliyetleri · Finansal Performans · BRIC Ülkeleri

Abstract

The consequences of the recent corporate scandals have directed the attention of corporations towards the opportunistic behaviors of managers; thus, evaluation of agency costs encountered within the firm. The divergence of interest between the managers and shareholders has a potential to con- stitute a threat to the firms’ financial performance. Due to the rising importance of the topic for both academic literature and practical grounds, this study attempts to evaluate the link between agency costs of equity and financial performance of selected public firms operating in BRIC countries be- tween the years 2003 and 2014, inclusive. Three measures have been utilized to proxy for agency costs of equity; namely, asset utilization ratio, operating expense ratio, and the ratio of free cash flows to total assets. An additional interaction variable is also generated to take into account the existence of investment opportunities when free cash flows are abundant. The findings based on panel data analysis are considered to provide useful insight upon an additional explanation to the presence of financial performance differences among the firms other than simply firm-specific attributes and emphasize the importance of finding mechanisms for alleviating agency costs to attain the overall goal of share- holder wealth maximization.

Özet

Son zamanlarda yaşanan şirket skandallarının sonuçları firmaların dikkatini yöneticilerin fırsatçı davranışlarına ve dolayısıyla firmalarda karşılaşılan vekalet maliyetlerinin değerlendirilmesine yönelt- miştir. Yöneticiler ve hissedarlar arasındaki çıkar çatışmaları firmaların finansal performanslarına yönelik bir tehdit unsuru oluşturmaktadır. İlgili konunun akademik literatür ve uygulama alanındaki artan önemi sebebiyle, bu çalışma öz sermayeye ilişkin vekalet maliyetleri ve finansal performans arasındaki ilişkiyi BRIC ülkelerinde faaliyet gösteren seçilmiş halka açık firmalar üzerinde 2003 ve 2014 yılları arasında değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Öz sermayeye ilişkin vekalet maliyetlerini ölçmek için üç farklı değişken kullanılmıştır. Bunlar; varlık kullanım oranı, faaliyet giderleri oranı ve serbet nakim akımların toplam varlıklara oranı olarak belirlenmiştir. Ayrıca, nakit akımlarının bol olduğu durumda yatırım fırsatlarının varlığını göz önünde bulundurmak için de ek bir etkileşim değişkeni oluşturulmuştur. Panel veri analize dayandırılmış bulgular firmalar arasındaki finansal performans farklılıklarına ek bir açıklama getirmiş ve bunların sadece firmaya özgü niteliklerden kaynaklanmadığını vurgulamıştır. Ayrıca, bu çalışma hissedar- ların varlıklarını maksimize etme amacına ulaşmak için firmaların vekalet maliyetlerini düşürmek adına çeşitli makenizmalar geliştirmenin önemini vurgulamaktadır.

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Cite This Article

GÜRBÜZ, A. O., AYBARS, A., YEŞİLYURT, S. (2016). THE ROLE OF AGENCY COSTS IN EXPLAINING FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON SELECTED PUBLIC FIRMS IN BRIC COUNTRIES. Öneri Dergisi, Cilt: 12 - Sayı: 45, 187–210. https://ajindex.com/articles/35540

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