Journals / Business and Management Studies: An International Journal / 2017 / Cilt: 5 - Sayı: 4

BOARD OF DIRECTORS STRUCTURE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: BIST MANUFACTURING CASE

YÖNETİM KURULU YAPISI VE KÂR YÖNETİMİ UYGULAMALARI: BİST İMALAT SEKTÖRÜ ÖRNEĞİ

Pages
119–136
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

There is no supporting evidence that the proportion of audit comittee members reduces earnings management practices

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:The aim of this study is to investigate association between firms’ board structure (independent members, audit comittee, female membership and board of directors size) and earnings management.
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Key Findings & Data:Within the scope of the study, data covering the years 2012 - 2016 belonging to the firms operating in the BIST Manufacturing Sector were used.
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Conclusion & Impact:There is no supporting evidence that the proportion of audit comittee members reduces earnings management practices
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:2012 - 2016 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

The aim of this study is to investigate association between firms’ board structure (independent members, audit comittee, female membership and board of directors size) and earnings management. For the purpose of investigating associations four different earnings management models were used. In addition, four hypotheses were tested in the context of the study. Within the scope of the study, data covering the years 2012 - 2016 belonging to the firms operating in the BIST Manufacturing Sector were used. According to results there is a relationship between the proportion of independent members in the board and earnings management practices based on accrual and sales manipulation. Obtained results confirm that the increase in the proportion of female members on the board reduces earnings management practices based on cash flow and sales manipulation. There is also evidence that an increase in the size of the board reduces earnings management practices bas ed on cash flow and income manipulation. There is no supporting evidence that the proportion of audit comittee members reduces earnings management practices

Özet

Bu çalışmanın amacı firmaların yönetim kurulu yapısı (bağımsız üye, denetim komitesi, kadın üye ve yönetim kurulu büyüklüğü) ve kâr yönetimi uygulamaları arasındaki ilişkinin incelenmesidir. Söz konusu ilişkinin incelenmesi amacıyla dört farklı kâr yönetimi tahmin modeli kullanılmış ve dört hipotez test edilmiştir. Çalışma kapsamında BIST İmalat Sektöründe faaliyet gösteren firmalara ait 2011 - 2016 yıllarını kapsayan veriler kullanılmıştır. Elde edilen sonuçlara göre; yönetim kurulu içindeki bağımsız üye oranının tahakkuk ve gelir manipülasyonu temelli kâr yönetimi uygulamaları ile ilişkili olduğu ve yönetim kurulundaki kadın üye oranının artmasının nak it ak ışı ve gelir manipülasyonu temelli k âr yönetimi uygulamalarını azalttığı görülmüştür. Yönetim kurulu büyüklüğünün artmasının da nakit akışı ve gelir manipülasyonu temelli kâr yönetimi uygulamalarını azalttığı tespit edilmiştir. Çalışma kapsamında elde edilen bulguların denetim komitesi üye oranının kâr yönetimi uygulamalarını azalttığı hipotezini desteklemediği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır

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Cite This Article

HACIHASANOĞLU, T., DALKILIÇ, E., TEMİZ, H. (2017). BOARD OF DIRECTORS STRUCTURE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: BIST MANUFACTURING CASE. Business and Management Studies: An International Journal, Cilt: 5 - Sayı: 4, 119–136. https://ajindex.com/articles/352002

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