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Journals / Kutadgubilig: Felsefe Bilim Araştırmaları / 2014 / Sayı: 26

Problem of free will and intentionality in the theory of philosophical actions

Felsefi eylem teorisinde özgür irade ve niyetlilik sorunu

VEDAT ÇELEBİ
Pages
119–135
DOI
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Thus, in this article the structure of human action, and the relation of

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Objective & Hypothesis:The main subject of the philosophical action theory is to examine consciousness or reasons behind human actions.
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Key Findings & Data:Basic matter of debate is connected with causally explaining of impact of consciousness, intention and will on the action.
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Conclusion & Impact:Thus, in this article the structure of human action, and the relation of
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Abstract

The main subject of the philosophical action theory is to examine consciousness or reasons behind human actions. Basic matter of debate is connected with causally explaining of impact of consciousness, intention and will on the action. As for, the relation between intentionality and voluntary action, it is related to separation of what a person can and cannot control consciously. On the one hand, there are behaviors that are conducted intentionally and consciously; on the other hand, there are unintentional behaviors that cannot be controlled even if they are wanted to be controlled. Doubtlessly, each action of human was not conducted by intention. In that case, the question of “How can intentional and unintentional behaviors be distinguished from each other?” is important. For the answer to this question a relation of action with intention and will must be established. In this direction, the problem of free will and intentionality will be examined within the frame of the answers to questions which are the most basic problems of philosophical action theory such as which bodily movements will be counted as action?, what does the action state in terms of philosophical action theory?, what qualifies a behavior as action?, and afterwards the relation of the action with will, intention, and consciousness will be put forth with reference to different philosophers. Thus, in this article the structure of human action, and the relation of

Özet

Bu makalede, felsefi eylem teorisinin en temel problemleri, hangi bedensel ha- reFelsefi eylem teorisinin ana konusu insan eylemlerinin ardındaki bilinç ya da nedenlerin incelenmesidir. Temel tartışma konusu bilinç, niyet ve iradenin eylem üzerindeki etkisinin nedensel olarak açıklanmasıyla ilişkilidir. Niyetlilik ve iradi eylem ilişkisi ise, bir kişinin neyi bilinçli olarak kontrol ede- bildiği ve neyi bilinçli olarak kontrol edemediğinin ayrılmasıyla ilgilidir. Bir taraftan isteyerek ve bilinçli bir şekilde niyet ederek yapılan davranışlar vardır, diğer taraftan kontrol etmek istenilse de kontrol edilemeyen istemsiz davranışlar vardır. Kuşkusuz insanın yaptığı her eylem niyetle yapılmış değildir. O hâlde niyetli eylem ile niyetsiz eylem birbirinden nasıl ayırt edilebilir? sorusu önemlidir. Bu sorunun cevabı için eylemin, niyet ve irade ile ilişkisinin kurulması gerekir. Bu doğrultuda özgür irade ve niyetlilik sorunu, felsefi eylem teorisinin en temel problemleri olan hangi bedensel hareketler eylem olarak sayılacaktır?, felsefi eylem teorisi açısından eylem neyi ifade etmektedir?, bir davranışı eylem olarak nitelendiren nedir? gibi sorulara verilen cevaplar çerçevesinde incelenecek ve devamında eylemin niyet, bilinç ve irade ile ilişkisi farklı filozoflardan hareketle ortaya konulacaktır. Böylece bu makalede insan eyleminin yapısı ve eylemin niyet, nedensellik ve özgür irade ile olan ilişkisi değerlendirilecektir.

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Cite This Article

ÇELEBİ, V. (2014). Problem of free will and intentionality in the theory of philosophical actions. Kutadgubilig: Felsefe Bilim Araştırmaları, Sayı: 26, 119–135. https://ajindex.com/articles/344413

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