Journals / Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi / 2006 / Sayı: 15

Kurumsal Çerçeve Şartlarının Almanya'da Risk Sermayesi Finansmanına Etkileri

Pages
137–159
DOI
—
🏛️Bibliographic metadata and full text access for this article are provided via DergiPark.
DergiPark Record ↗
✨

AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Consequently the American research results can not directly be transferred into German venture capital market.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:During the last years finance theory has been considering the meaning of institutional framework in the process of forming financial contracts in various countries.
📊
Key Findings & Data:In this context the following paper compares the different, for Anglo-Saxon and German market typical contract structures of venture capital financing.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:Consequently the American research results can not directly be transferred into German venture capital market.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

During the last years finance theory has been considering the meaning of institutional framework in the process of forming financial contracts in various countries. In this context the following paper compares the different, for Anglo-Saxon and German market typical contract structures of venture capital financing. Thereby it has to be questioned, whether the institutional features has an influence over the incentive-optimal contract creation. Through a comparative analysis of convertible preferred stocks, participating preferred stocks and sleeping partnership, it has been pointed out that sleeping partnership, as the common type of financing form in Germany, can create comparable incentives with the convertibles. As a result this type of financing can equally be faced with the Anglo-Saxon financial practices. Therefore institutional framework has an influence on the choice of financial structure. Consequently the American research results can not directly be transferred into German venture capital market.

Özet

Finans teorisi farklı ülkelerdeki finansal sözleşmelerin düzenlenmesinde kurumsal çerçeve şartlarının anlamını son yıllarda yoğun bir şekilde incelemektedir. Bu çalışma, bu bağlamda risk sermayesi finansmanının Anglosakson ve Alman piyasaları açısından farklı niteliklerdeki tipik sözleşme yapılarını karşılaştırmaktadır. Burada kurumsal özelliklerin menfaatleri optimal şekilde dengeleyen sözleşmeler oluşturulmasına etki edip etmediğinin değerlendirilmesi gerekir. Dönüştürülebilir imtiyazlı hisse senetleri, kara iştirakli dönüştürülebilir imtiyazlı hisse senetleri ve gizli iştiraklerin karşılaştırmalı bir analizi sonucunda, Almanya'da yaygın bir finansman şekli olarak kullanılan gizli iştirakin, dönüştürülebilir finansal araçlarla kıyaslandığında, aynı ölçüde cazip nitelik taşıyabileceği gösterilmektedir. Buna bağlı olarak sözkonusu finansman şekli, Anglosakson finansman uygulamalarına eş düzeyde bir alternatif oluşturabilecektir. Kurumsal çerçeve şartları da finansman yapısının seçiminde etkili olmaktadır. Netice itibariyle Amerika'da yapılan araştırma sonuçlarının Alman sermaye piyasasına aynen uyarlanmaması yerinde olacaktır. JEL Sınıflaması: G24, G32, G35

🔖

Cite This Article

RUDOLPH, B., HAAGEN, F., ACAR, M. B. (2006). Kurumsal Çerçeve Şartlarının Almanya'da Risk Sermayesi Finansmanına Etkileri. Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Sayı: 15, 137–159. https://ajindex.com/articles/316741

References (9)

  1. Aghion, Philippe / Bolton, Patrick (1992): An Incomplete Contracts Approach to financial Contracting, in: Review of Economic Studies 59, s. 473-494.
  2. Admati, Anat R. / Pfleiderer, Paul (1994): Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists, in: The Journal of Finance 49, s. 371-402.
  3. Bascha, Andreas (2001): Hybride Beteiligungsformen bei Venture Capital, Wiesbaden. Bascha, Andreas / Walz, Uwe (2002): Financing Practices in the German Venture Capital Industry. An Empirical Assessment, CFS Working Paper 2002 / 08. Baums, Theodor / Möller, Matthias (2000): Venture Capital: U.S. - amerihanisches Modeli und deutschesAktienrecht, Arbeitspapier, Universitât Osnabrück. Becker, Ralf / Hellmann, Thomas (2002): The Genesis of Venture Capital— lessons from the German Experience, Working Paper, CESifo München, November 2002.
  4. Betsch, Oskar / Groh, Alexander / Schmidt, Kay (2000): Griindungs- und Wachstums-jinansierung innovativer Unternehmen, Oldenbourg. Bergemann, Dirk / Hege, Ulrich (1998): Venture Capital Financing Moral Hazard, and Learning in: Journal of Banking & Finance 22, s. 703 - 735. Black, Bernard S. / Gilson, Ronald J. (1998): Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Bank versus Stocks Markets, in: Journal of Financial Economics 47, s. 243-277.
  5. Bottazzi, Laura / Rin, Marco Da / Hellmann, Thomas (2004): What Role of Legal System in Venture Capital Theory and Evidence, Working Paper Bocconi University, March. BVK (2004): Teilstatistik fur Venture Capital der BVK Jahresstatistik 2003, unter: http://www.bvk-ev.de/pdf/61.pdf (Stand: 10. Jul. 2004).
  6. Casamatta, Chaterine (2003): Financing and Advising Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists, in: The Journal of Finance 58, s. 2059-2085.
  7. Chandler, Gaylen / Hanks, Steven (1993): Founder Competence, the Environment, and Venture Performance, in: Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 18, s. 77-88.
  8. Cornelli, Francesca / Yosha, Oved (2003): Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities, in: The Review of Economic Studies 70, s. 1 -48. Curnming, Douglas (2002): United States Venture Capital Finandal Contracting. Foreign Securities, Working Paper, University of Alberta, May. Denis, David J. (2004): Entrepreneurial Finance: an Overview of the Issues and Evidence, in: Journal of Corporate Finance 10, s. 301-326.
  9. Dessein, Wouter (2004): Information and Control in Ventures _____& Alliances, Working Paper, University of Chicago, May. Diamond, Douglas (1991): Debt Maturity Structu