Journals / ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi / 2015 / Cilt: 42 - Sayı: 2

Çok uluslu şirketler arasındaki rekabetin bir modeli

A model of competition between multinationals

Pages
271–298
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The results point to a non-linear relationship between trade and investment liberalization and foreign direct investment.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This study models competition between multinationals sequentially entering the same market, and analyzes how they choose their entry modes between trade, greenfield investment and acquisition, and how competition amongst them affects their choices.
📊
Key Findings & Data:I discuss two important factors that lead a multinational whether or not to acquire a local firm: the intensity of pre- and post-acquisition competition.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:The results point to a non-linear relationship between trade and investment liberalization and foreign direct investment.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

This study models competition between multinationals sequentially entering the same market, and analyzes how they choose their entry modes between trade, greenfield investment and acquisition, and how competition amongst them affects their choices. I discuss two important factors that lead a multinational whether or not to acquire a local firm: the intensity of pre- and post-acquisition competition. The former determines both the acquisition price and the profitability of the next best alternative entry mode, whereas the latter determines the extent of business stealing by the rival. The results point to a non-linear relationship between trade and investment liberalization and foreign direct investment.

Özet

Bu çalışma, aynı piyasaya sıralı giriş yapan çok uluslu şirketler arasındaki rekabeti modeller, ve bu şirketlerin piyasa giriş şekli olarak ticaret, doğrudan yabancı yatırımlar ve firma alımları arasında nasıl seçim yaptıklarını ve rekabetin bu seçimleri nasıl etkilediğini analiz eder. Çalışmada, yerel bir firmayı satın almada çok uluslu şirketleri yönlendiren, iki önemli unsur tartışılmaktadır: satış öncesi ve satış sonrası rekabetin şiddeti. İlki, hem firmanın satış fiyatını, hem de ikinci en iyi piyasa giriş şeklinin kârlılığını belirlerken, ikincisi, işlerin rakip firma tarafından ele geçirilme düzeyini belirler. Sonuçlar, ticaret ve yatırım liberalizasyonu ile doğrudan yabancı yatırımlar arasında doğrusal olmayanbir ilişkiyi işaret etmektedir

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Cite This Article

KOSKA, O. A. (2015). Çok uluslu şirketler arasındaki rekabetin bir modeli. ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi, Cilt: 42 - Sayı: 2, 271–298. https://ajindex.com/articles/291961

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