SavedAdd your journal

Journals / Finans Politik ve Ekonomik Yorumlar Dergisi / 2014 / Cilt: 51 - Sayı: 591

The Empirical Analysis of Pork Barreling Focused on Re-Election in the Allocation Public Investments (1987-2001)

Kamu Yatırımlarının Tahsisinde Tekrar Seçilme Odaklı Hizmet Kayırmacılığının Ampirik Analizi (1987-2001)

SEVİNÇ YARAŞIR TÜLÜMCE
Pages
53–70
DOI
—
🏛️Bibliographic metadata and full text access for this article are provided via DergiPark.
DergiPark Record ↗
✨

AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The results reveal the existence of the pork barrel in Turkey.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:As one type of political degeneration in public choice theory, pork barreling is inc- luded the impact of political factors in the allocation public resources to electoral districts.
📊
Key Findings & Data:In the empirical analysis, three different models are used for the peri- od 1987-2001 by using Dynamic Panel Data.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:The results reveal the existence of the pork barrel in Turkey.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:2001 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

As one type of political degeneration in public choice theory, pork barreling is inc- luded the impact of political factors in the allocation public resources to electoral districts. A pork barrel project is a distributive public policy. Distributive policies are named as political decisions that focus on benefits in the specific geographic constituency and finances expenditures through generalized taxation. The pur- pose of this study is to investigate the economic and political factors that affect the allocation of public investments in Turkey and analyze the presence of pork barreling. In the empirical analysis, three different models are used for the peri- od 1987-2001 by using Dynamic Panel Data. According to the findings, the eco- nomic and political factors are important in the allocation of public investment to electoral districts. The results reveal the existence of the pork barrel in Turkey.

Özet

Kamu tercihi teorisinde siyasal yozlaşma türlerinden biri olarak ele alınan hizmet kayırmacılığı, kamu kaynaklarının seçim çevrelerine tahsisindeki politik faktör- lerin etkisini içermektedir. Bir hizmet kayırmacılığı projesi aynı zamanda bir da- ğıtıcı politikadır. Dağıtıcı politikalar, faydalarından belirli seçim çevresinin fayda sağladığı, harcamalarının vergi gelirleri ile finanse edildiği politik bir karardır. Bu çalışma, 1987-2001 yılları için Türkiye’deki kamu yatırımlarının tahsisinde etki- li olan ekonomik ve politik faktörleri araştırarak, hizmet kayırmacılığının varlığını analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ampirik analizde “Dinamik Panel Veri Modelleri” kullanılarak, 1987-2001 dönemi için üç ayrı model tahmin edilmiştir. Tahmin mo- del sonuçlarına göre, kamu yatırımlarının seçim çevrelerine tahsisinde ekonomik ve politik faktörler önemlidir. Ampirik bulgular, Türkiye’de hizmet kayırmacılığının varlığını da ortaya koymaktadır.

🔖

Cite This Article

TÜLÜMCE, S. Y. (2014). The Empirical Analysis of Pork Barreling Focused on Re-Election in the Allocation Public Investments (1987-2001). Finans Politik ve Ekonomik Yorumlar Dergisi, Cilt: 51 - Sayı: 591, 53–70. https://ajindex.com/articles/210293

📄 Full Text PDF Viewer

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...

References (16)

  1. ABDÜL JALİL, Zafarullah; (2010), “The Political Economics of The Malaysian Subnational Governments' Fiscal Behavior”, MPRA Paper, No. 24988, pp. 1-23
  2. AGNANi, Betty ve Henry ARAY; (2010), “Testing for Pork Bar- rel Politics in Public InfrastructureAccumulationTheCaseofSp ain”,http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:TX24ZTeiXGUJ: scholar.google.com/+Testing+for+Pork+Barrel+Politics+in+Pu blic+Infrastructure+Accumulation&hl=tr&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1, (Erişim Tarihi: 15.10.2010).
  3. AKTAN, Coşkun Can; (1992), Politik Yozlaşma ve Kleptokrasi: 1980-1990
  4. Türkiye Deneyimi, Alfa Yayınları,
  5. İstanbul.
  6. AKTAN, Coşkun Can; (2001),
  7. Kamu Ekonomisi ve Kamu Mali- yesi, Anadolu Matbaacılık, İzmir.
  8. ALVAREZ, Michael ve Jason SAVİNG; (1997), “Deficits, Dem- ocrats, and Distributive Benefits: Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel in the 1980s”, Political Research Quarterly, 50(4), pp. 809-833.
  9. BALTAGİ, Badi H.; (2001),
  10. Econometrics Analysis of Panel Data, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, New York. BALTAGİ, Badi H.; (2005), Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, 3. Edition,
  11. Wiley, New York. BROWN, Charles ve Peter JACKSON; (1990),
  12. Public Sector Economics, Basil Blackwell, 4th Edition,
  13. London. BUCHANAN, James; (2000), “The Achievement and the Lim- its of Public Choice in Diagnosing Government Failure and in Offering Bases for Constructive Reform”, James M. Buchanan (Ed.), Politics As Public Choice,, Liberty Fund Inc., Vol: 13. CADOT, Olivier, Lars Hendrick RÖLLER ve Andreas STEPHAN; (2006), “Contribution to Productivity or Pork Bar- rel? The Two Faces of Infrastructure Investment”, Journal of Public Economics, 90, pp. 1133– 1153 CALVO, Ernesto ve Maria. MURİLLO; (2004), “Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market”, American Journal of Political Science, 48(4), pp. 742–757 CASE, Anne; (2001), “Election Goals and Income Redistribu- tion: Recent Evidence from Albania”, European Economic Re- view, 45, pp. 405- 423. CASTELLS, Antoni ve Albert SOLE-OLLE; (2005), “The Re- gional Allocation of Infrastructure Investment: The Role of Equity, Efficiency and Political Factors”, European Economic Review, 49 (5), pp. 1165-1205.
  14. COSTA I. FONT, Joan, Eduardo RODRİGUEZ-OREGGiA ve Dario LUNAPLA; (2003), “Political Competition and Pork Barrel Poltics in the Allocation of Public Investment in Mexico”, Public Choice,116, pp. 185-204
  15. COX, Gary ve Mathew MCCUBBINS; (1986), “Electoral Politics As A Redistributive Game”, The Journal of Politics, 48(2), pp. 370-389
  16. DAHLBERG, Maltz ve Eva JOHANSSON; (2