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Journals / Finans Politik ve Ekonomik Yorumlar Dergisi / 2015 / Cilt: 52 - Sayı: 607

Özel Emeklilik Piyasasinda Gelir Riskleri, Operasyonel Maliyetler ve Devlet Müdahalesi

Income Risks, Operational Costs and Government Intervention in the Private Pension Market

Renginar DAYANGAÇ
BİLGE ÖZTÜRK GÖKTUNA
Pages
77–86
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

This, however, is an open question and contradicts the starting point of individual accounts; to offer many fruitful free market opportunities.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This paper deals with the participation to individual accounts in the last decade in Turkey.
📊
Key Findings & Data:Regulation of retire- ment insurance market seems necessary to increase attractiveness of funded scheme.
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Conclusion & Impact:This, however, is an open question and contradicts the starting point of individual accounts; to offer many fruitful free market opportunities.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

This paper deals with the participation to individual accounts in the last decade in Turkey. We first deal with the evolution of administrative costs and their im- pact. Then, we deal the different categories of agents contributing to this priva- te investment plan in term of income variability. We conclude with the impact of government intervention to this retirement investment plan. Regulation of retire- ment insurance market seems necessary to increase attractiveness of funded scheme. This, however, is an open question and contradicts the starting point of individual accounts; to offer many fruitful free market opportunities.

Özet

Bu çalişma, son yillarda Türkiye’de özel emeklilik fonlarina katilim üzerinedir. İlk olarak, özel emeklilik fonlarinin yönetimine ilişkin operasyonel maliyetlerin geli- şimi ve etkileri ele alindi. Ardindan bu özel yatirim planina katkida bulunan bi- reyleri gelirlerinin değişkenliğine göre inceledik. Özel emeklilik piyasasina dev- let müdahalesinin etkileri tartişildi. Bu yatirim olanağinin çekiciliğini arttirmak için devlet müdahalesi gerekli gözükmektedir. Bu durum ise tartişmaya açiktir çünkü başlangiçta özel emeklilik fonlari birçok verimli serbest piyasa firsatlari sunduk- lari için ortaya atilmişlardir.

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Cite This Article

DAYANGAÇ, R., GÖKTUNA, B. Ö. (2015). Özel Emeklilik Piyasasinda Gelir Riskleri, Operasyonel Maliyetler ve Devlet Müdahalesi. Finans Politik ve Ekonomik Yorumlar Dergisi, Cilt: 52 - Sayı: 607, 77–86. https://ajindex.com/articles/199106

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