SavedAdd your journal

Journals / Journal of Economics Finance and Accounting / 2026 / Volume: 5 Issue: 3

FINANCIAL MANIPULATION IN SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY

Mustafa Cikrikci0000-0002-2805-6079
Mustafa Ozyesil0000-0002-4442-7087
Pages
—
Publication Date
2018-09-30
DOI
—
🏛️Bibliographic metadata and full text access for this article are provided via DergiPark.
DergiPark Record ↗
✨

AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

This finding refers success rate for estimating manipulator firms in our model is % 55 (11/20).

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Purpose- This study aims to search whether financial manipulation practices was performed on Seasoned Equity Offerings (seos) by 41 firms in Borsa Istanbul for the 2010-2015 period.
📊
Key Findings & Data:Methodology- Probit analysis and Beneish (1999) model were used in the study. 9 financial ratios were used as independent variables in the probit model in order to find out wheter the firms make manipulation through these ratios.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:This finding refers success rate for estimating manipulator firms in our model is % 55 (11/20).
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:2010-2015 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Financial manipulation · seasoned equity offering · beneish model

Abstract

Purpose- This study aims to search whether financial manipulation practices was performed on Seasoned Equity Offerings (seos) by 41 firms in Borsa Istanbul for the 2010-2015 period. Methodology- Probit analysis and Beneish (1999) model were used in the study. 9 financial ratios were used as independent variables in the probit model in order to find out wheter the firms make manipulation through these ratios. For the purpose of estimating sample firms’ tendency for manipulation clustering analysis was also used. Manipulation possibilities were calculated for each firms. Finally based on average index values, firms were grouped as a having high and low manipulation tendency. Findings- In the model, based on an event study conducted via the bulletins and reports of BIST and SPK, 20 firms were considered as manipulator while the remaining considered as control firms. It was observed that most of manipulation techniques (%89) were made in order to increase period profit. Conclusion- It has been confirmed that firms that conducted seos applied the financial manipulation techniques during the analysis period. 3 independent variables include Asset Quality Index, Inventories / Net Sales Index and Total Accruals / Total Assets index were found to be statistically significant in determining whether firms apply financial manipulation. Based on the robustness test, the model’s estimating power was calculated as %70.23. According to the model’s reliability test, 11 firms were found as a having high manipulation tendency. This finding refers success rate for estimating manipulator firms in our model is % 55 (11/20).

🔖

Cite This Article

Cikrikci, M., Ozyesil, M. (2018). FINANCIAL MANIPULATION IN SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY. Journal of Economics Finance and Accounting, Volume: 5 Issue: 3. https://ajindex.com/articles/1591965

📄 Full Text PDF Viewer

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...

References (30)

  1. ACFE. (2010). Report to the nation on occupational fraud and abuse. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
  2. Acharya, V. V., Lambrecht, B. M. (2015). A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders. The Review of Financial Studies, 28 (9): 2534-2574.
  3. AICPA. (2002). Consideration of fraud in a financial statement audit. 1719 -1770.
  4. Akdağ, M. (2011). SPSS’de istatistiksel analizler. https://cms.inonu.edu.tr /uploads/old/5/1328/spss-testleri.doc. [Erişim Tarihi: 09.08.2017].
  5. Beneish, D. M. (1997). Detecting GAAP violation: implications for assessing earnings management among firms with extreme financial performance. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 16 (3): 271-309.
  6. Beneish, D. M. (1999). The detection of earnings manipulation. Financial Analyst Journal. 55 (5): 24-26.
  7. Shu, P. G., Chiang, S. J. (2014). Firm size, timing and earnings management of seasoned equity offerings. International Review of Economics & Finance. 29 (1): 177-194.
  8. Beneish, D. M. (2001). Earnings management: a perspective. Managerial Finance. 27 (12): 3-17.
  9. Çelik, İ. E. (2016). The relationship between accounting practices and effects of financial crisis in Turkey: a case study on an oil company. Emerging Markets Journal. 6 (1): 47-58.
  10. Deangelo, L. E. (1986). Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: a study of management buyouts of public stockholders. The Accounting Review. 61 (3): 400-420.
  11. Fang, C. (2017). Empirical research on accrual and real earnings management: evidence from seasoned equity offerings. Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Innovation & Management, 1121-1126.
  12. Fındık, H., Öztürk, E. (2016). Measurement of financial information manipulation with the help of Beneish Model: a research on BIST manufacturing industry. Journal of Business Research Turk. 8(1): 483-499.
  13. Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 7 (1-3): 85-107.
  14. Islam, M. S., Uddin, M., Ahmad, S. (2002). The operating performance of firms conducting seasoned equity offerings In Bangladesh. Journal of Business Studies. 23 (2): 1-42.
  15. Jo, H., Kim, Y. (2008). Ethics and disclosure: a study of the financial performance of firms ın the seasoned equity offerings market. Journal of Business Ethics. 80 (4): 855-878.
  16. Jones, J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research. 29 (2): 193 – 228.
  17. Kothari, S. P., Mizik, N., Roychowdhury, S. (2016). Managing for the moment: the role of earnings management via real activities versus accruals in SEO valuation. American Accounting Association. 91 (2): 559-586.
  18. Küçüksözen, C. (2004). Finansal bilgi manipülasyonu: nedenleri, yöntemleri, amaçları, teknikleri, sonuçları ve İmkb şirketleri üzerine ampirik bir çalışma. Doktora Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü.
  19. Li, S., Richie, N. (2016). Income smoothing and the cost of debt. China Journal Accounting Research. 9 (3): 175 – 190.
  20. Mulford, W. C., Comiskey., E. E. (2002). The financial numbers game – detecting creative accounting practices. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc.
  21. Rezaee, Z. (2005). Causes, consequences and deterence of financial statament fraud. Critical Perpectives on Accounting. 16 (3): 277 – 298.
  22. Spathis, C. T. (2002). Detecting false financial statements using published data: some evidence from Greece. Managerial Auditing Journal, 17 (4): 179 – 191.
  23. Tassadaq, F., Malik, A. Q. (2015). Creative accounting and financial reporting: model development and emprical testing. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues. 5 (2): 544-551.
  24. Tekin, E. (2017). 2010-2014 yılları arasında Türkiye’de halka açık şirketlerde manipülasyon üzerine Beneish Modeli ile ampirik çalışma. Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Başkent Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü İşletme Anabilim Dalı Muhasebe – Finansman Bölümü.
  25. Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., Wong, T. J. (1998). Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics. 50 (1): 63 - 99.
  26. Ulusan, H. (2008). Değerleme esasları ve finansal tabloların niteliksel özellikleri açısından incelenmesi. Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi. 8 (1): 129-154.
  27. Zhang, X. (2016). Income smoothing, idiosyncratic risk & CEO turnover. Journal of Mathematical Finance. 6 (1): 1 – 16.
  28. Kothari, S. P., Mizik, N., Roychowdhury, S. (2016). Managing for the moment: the role of earnings management via real activities versus accruals in SEO valuation. American Accounting Association. 91 (2): 559-586.
  29. Rezaee, Z. (2005). Causes, consequences and deterence of financial statament fraud. Critical Perpectives on Accounting. 16 (3): 277 – 298.
  30. Spathis, C. T. (2002). Detecting false financial statements using published data: some evidence from Greece. Managerial Auditing Journal, 17 (4): 179 – 191.