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Journals / Iğdır Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi / 2026 / Sayı: 14

Task Ambiguity and Firm Productivity in Hybrid Work: A Multi-Task Principal-Agent Approach

Hibrit Çalışmada Görev Belirsizliği ve Firma Üretkenliği: Çoklu Görev Asil-Vekil Yaklaşımı

Ersel Ertürk(ISTANBUL ESENYURT UNIVERSITY)0000-0001-6932-1193
Pages
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Publication Date
2026-09-04
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The findings indicate that task uncertainty acts as an additional risk factor by increasing the effective noise level to σ²(1+τ), reducing the effort allocated to unobservable activities, and undermining the effectiveness of incentive-based compensation systems.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The widespread adoption of hybrid work models necessitates a reevaluation of the economic concepts governing intra-firm contracts and job design.
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Key Findings & Data:This study examines the impact of job ambiguity on organizational productivity using a conceptual framework that integrates personnel economics, principal-agent theory, imperfect contract theory, and decision-making under uncertainty.
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Conclusion & Impact:The findings indicate that task uncertainty acts as an additional risk factor by increasing the effective noise level to σ²(1+τ), reducing the effort allocated to unobservable activities, and undermining the effectiveness of incentive-based compensation systems.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Çalışma Ekonomisi · hibrit çalışma · üretkenlik

Abstract

The widespread adoption of hybrid work models necessitates a reevaluation of the economic concepts governing intra-firm contracts and job design. This study examines the impact of job ambiguity on organizational productivity using a conceptual framework that integrates personnel economics, principal-agent theory, imperfect contract theory, and decision-making under uncertainty. Four principal mechanisms clarify the impact of task ambiguity on productivity: information search expenses, decision-making delays, ex-post renegotiation expenses, and effective effort expenditures. The analysis used a revised multi-task principal-agent model developed by Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom, integrating a parameter for task uncertainty. The findings indicate that task uncertainty acts as an additional risk factor by increasing the effective noise level to σ²(1+τ), reducing the effort allocated to unobservable activities, and undermining the effectiveness of incentive-based compensation systems. Numerical simulations demonstrate that increased task ambiguity non-linearly reduces the equilibrium effort level, with effort declining by around 83% as the τ parameter rises from 0 to 2. The study argues that inadequate employment contracts in the Turkish labor market intensify these effects and proposes a three-tiered regulatory framework for intra-firm contract development.

Özet

Hibrit çalışma modellerinin yaygınlaşması, firma içi sözleşmelerin ve iş tasarımının ekonomik temellerinin yeniden değerlendirilmesini gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu çalışma, görev belirsizliğinin firma üretkenliği üzerindeki etkisini; Personnel Economics, Principal-Agent Theory, eksik sözleşme teorisi ve belirsizlik altında karar verme yaklaşımını bütünleştiren kavramsal bir çerçeve aracılığıyla incelemektedir. Buna göre, görev belirsizliğinin üretkenlik üzerindeki etkisi dört temel mekanizma üzerinden açıklanmaktadır: bilgi arama maliyetleri, karar gecikmeleri, ex-post yeniden müzakere maliyetleri ve efektif çaba maliyetleri. Analiz, Bengt Holmström ve Paul Milgrom tarafından geliştirilen çoklu görev asil-vekil modelinin görev belirsizliği parametresi içerecek şekilde uyarlanmış bir versiyonu ile desteklenmektedir. Bulgular, görev belirsizliğinin etkin gürültü düzeyini σ²(1+τ) biçiminde artırarak ek bir risk faktörü gibi işlediğini, gözlemlenemeyen görevlere ayrılan çabayı azalttığını ve teşvik temelli ücretlendirme mekanizmalarının etkinliğini zayıflattığını göstermektedir. Sayısal simülasyonlar, görev belirsizliğindeki artışların denge çaba düzeyini doğrusal olmayan biçimde azalttığını ve τ parametresinin 0’dan 2’ye yükselmesi durumunda çabanın yaklaşık %83 oranında düştüğünü ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışma ayrıca, Türkiye işgücü piyasasında eksik istihdam sözleşmelerinin bu etkileri güçlendirdiğini savunmakta ve firma içi sözleşme tasarımına yönelik üç düzeyli bir politika çerçevesi önermektedir.

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Cite This Article

Ertürk, E. (2026). Task Ambiguity and Firm Productivity in Hybrid Work: A Multi-Task Principal-Agent Approach. Iğdır Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Sayı: 14. https://doi.org/10.58618/igdiriibf.1959647

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