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Journals / International Review of Economics and Management / 2026 / Cilt: 4 Sayı: 1

INCENTIVE ROOTS OF MANAGERIAL (EXCESSIVE) RISK TAKING AND AN ASSESMENT OF POLICY RESPONSES

Sadettin Haluk Çitçi
Pages
29–44
Publication Date
2016-04-07
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The paper also assesses main policy responses against excessive risk taking and concludes that current policies centered on fixing contractual schemes are not adequate to fix these incentive problems.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:There are many incentive factors affecting managers’ risk appetite.
📊
Key Findings & Data:This study reviews the incentive literature and analyses arguments highlighting the impact of implicit and explicit incentives on managerial risk taking and the results of empirical studies on the issue.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:The paper also assesses main policy responses against excessive risk taking and concludes that current policies centered on fixing contractual schemes are not adequate to fix these incentive problems.
🔬Design:Review & Systematic Survey
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Incentives · Risk taking · Investment

Abstract

There are many incentive factors affecting managers’ risk appetite. This study reviews the incentive literature and analyses arguments highlighting the impact of implicit and explicit incentives on managerial risk taking and the results of empirical studies on the issue. The paper also assesses main policy responses against excessive risk taking and concludes that current policies centered on fixing contractual schemes are not adequate to fix these incentive problems.

Özet

There are many incentive factors affecting managers’ risk appetite. This study reviews the incentive literature and analyses arguments highlighting the impact of implicit and explicit incentives on managerial risk taking and the results of empirical studies on the issue. The paper also assesses main policy responses against excessive risk taking and concludes that current policies centered on fixing contractual schemes are not adequate to fix these incentive problems.

🔖

Cite This Article

Çitçi, S. H. (2016). INCENTIVE ROOTS OF MANAGERIAL (EXCESSIVE) RISK TAKING AND AN ASSESMENT OF POLICY RESPONSES. International Review of Economics and Management, Cilt: 4 Sayı: 1, 29–44. https://ajindex.com/articles/1499434

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