Journals / BDDK Bankacılık ve Finansal Piyasalar Dergisi / 2007 / Cilt: 1 - Sayı: 2

Bankacılık Sektörü Düzenlemesi ve Denetlemesi ile Bankacılık Krizleri: Ülke Bazında Ampirik Sınama

Prudential Regulation and Supervision of the Banking Sector and Banking Crises: A Cross Country Empiricial Investigation

Pages
11–29
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Test results indicate that capital regulations are a major factor in the prevention of crises, giving important support to the propositions towards ensuring higher capital requirements.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:The main purpose in this study is to see empirically whether there really exists a clear association between weaknesses in the regulation and supervision of the banking sector and banking crises.
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Key Findings & Data:However, tighter capital regulations do not seem to mitigate the negative impact of moral hazard problem generated by generous deposit insurance system.
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Conclusion & Impact:Test results indicate that capital regulations are a major factor in the prevention of crises, giving important support to the propositions towards ensuring higher capital requirements.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

The main purpose in this study is to see empirically whether there really exists a clear association between weaknesses in the regulation and supervision of the banking sector and banking crises. Test results indicate that capital regulations are a major factor in the prevention of crises, giving important support to the propositions towards ensuring higher capital requirements. However, tighter capital regulations do not seem to mitigate the negative impact of moral hazard problem generated by generous deposit insurance system. While inflation has a significant role in the generation of crisis, its significance weakens to a major extent, when accompanied with regulatory and supervisory factors. Hence, the significance of regulatory and supervisory framework of the banking system is once more justified.

Özet

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı bankacılık sektörünün düzenlenmesi ve denetlenmesindeki zayıflıklar ile bankacılık krizleri arasında net bir ilişki olup olmadığını ampirik olarak sınamaktır. Ampirik bulgulara göre sermaye düzenlemeleri krizlerin önlenmesinde önemli bir unsur olup, sermaye yeterliliklerinin yükseltilmesine yönelik önerileri destekler niteliktedir. Diğer taraftan, daha sıkı sermaye düzenlemeleri mevduat güvencesi tarafından oluşturulan “ahlaki çöküntü” probleminin olumsuz etkisini azaltacak nitelikte değildir. Enflasyon, krizlerin çıkmasında önemli rolü olan bir değişken iken, düzenleme ve denetlemeye ilişkin başka değişkenlerle birlikte test edildiğinde önemi azalmaktadır. Bu durum, bankacılık sektörünün düzenlemesi ve denetlemesinin önemini bir kez daha desteklemektedir.

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Cite This Article

GANİOĞLU, A. (2007). Bankacılık Sektörü Düzenlemesi ve Denetlemesi ile Bankacılık Krizleri: Ülke Bazında Ampirik Sınama. BDDK Bankacılık ve Finansal Piyasalar Dergisi, Cilt: 1 - Sayı: 2, 11–29. https://ajindex.com/articles/148564

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