Journals / Amme İdaresi Dergisi / 2015 / Cilt: 48 - Sayı: 1

Why do not personal responsibility and competition reduce total spending in health care?

Sağlıkta bireysel sorumluluk ve rekabet toplam maliyetleri neden düşürmez?

Pages
141–171
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In fact, there is neither theoretical nor empirical support in neo-classical health economics literature that supports either personal responsibility of patients or performance- based pay to service providers.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:Abstract: In this study, Health Transformation Program is discussed with reference to neo-classical health economics.
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Key Findings & Data:The Ministry of Health (MoH), in order in order to control rapidly rising healthcare costs, has begun to shift to practices that increase the personal responsibility of patients, albeit partly.
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Conclusion & Impact:In fact, there is neither theoretical nor empirical support in neo-classical health economics literature that supports either personal responsibility of patients or performance- based pay to service providers.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Abstract: In this study, Health Transformation Program is discussed with reference to neo-classical health economics. The Ministry of Health (MoH), in order in order to control rapidly rising healthcare costs, has begun to shift to practices that increase the personal responsibility of patients, albeit partly. Additionally, MoH introduced performance-based pay when procuring services from public and private hospitals in order to improve productivity. Health professionals in Turkey point out that healthcare is a social right, and should not be restricted based on ability to pay. In fact, there is neither theoretical nor empirical support in neo-classical health economics literature that supports either personal responsibility of patients or performance- based pay to service providers.

Özet

Öz: Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’de Sağlıkta Dönüşüm sürecini egemen iktisat anlayışı konumundaki neo-klasik yaklaşıma referansla tartışmaktır. Sağlık Bakanlığı (SB), son dönemde hızla artan sağlık harcamalarını kontrol altına alabilmek için, sağlık harcamalarının finansmanında kısmen de olsa hastaların kişisel sorumluluğunu arttıran yönde uygulamalara yönelmiştir. SB, ayrıca hem kamu hastanelerinden hem de özel sektörden hizmet alırken verimliliği artırmak amacıyla performansa dayalı ödeme sistemine geçmiştir. Tıp camiası sağlığın sosyal bir hak olduğu ve sosyal hakların kısıtlanamayacağı gerekçesiyle bu uygulamalara karşı çıkmaktadır. Halbuki, neo-klasik iktisat yazınında da bireysel sorumluluk ve performansa dayalı ödeme uygulamalarının sağlık finansmanında sorunlara çözüm olmadığı hem teorik hem de ampirik olarak ortaya konulmaktadır.

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Cite This Article

TEKGÜÇ, H., ATALAY, Z. N. G. (2015). Why do not personal responsibility and competition reduce total spending in health care?. Amme İdaresi Dergisi, Cilt: 48 - Sayı: 1, 141–171. https://ajindex.com/articles/148431

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