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Journals / Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies / 2010 / Cilt: 24 - Sayı: 1

GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN INVOLVEMENT OF FAMILY MEMBERS IN GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT OF TURKISH FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS AND BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY MEMBERS

TÜRK AİLE İŞLETME GRUPLARINDA FARKLI NESİL AİLE ÜYELERİNİN YÖNETİME KATILIMLARI VE ÖZGEÇMİŞ ÖZELLİKLERİ

ÖZLEM YILDIRIM-ÖKTEM
Pages
41–66
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The results show that a higher percentage of the old generation family members hold directorship positions at the holding board and at listed affiliates while a higher percentage of the young generation family members have executive positions at the affiliates.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:The paper explores the involvement of family members from different generations at various levels and functions of Turkish family business groups as well as their educational background and international experience.
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Key Findings & Data:The sample is composed of 57 family members who are involved in eight prominent family business groups in 2008.
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Conclusion & Impact:The results show that a higher percentage of the old generation family members hold directorship positions at the holding board and at listed affiliates while a higher percentage of the young generation family members have executive positions at the affiliates.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2008 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

The paper explores the involvement of family members from different generations at various levels and functions of Turkish family business groups as well as their educational background and international experience. The sample is composed of 57 family members who are involved in eight prominent family business groups in 2008. The results show that a higher percentage of the old generation family members hold directorship positions at the holding board and at listed affiliates while a higher percentage of the young generation family members have executive positions at the affiliates. With their pervasive involvement at both holding company and affiliate levels in boards and executive positions, owner families seem to both rule and manage the family business groups. The results also show that in both the older and the younger FBGs, the younger generation family members have significantly higher levels of education and international experience.

Özet

Araştırma, Türk aile işletme gruplarında farklı nesil aile üyelerinin işletmenin farklı seviye ve fonksiyonlarında yönetime katılımları ile eğitim ve uluslararası tecrübelerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Örnekleme, 2008 yılında Türkiye'deki en büyük sekiz aile işletme grubunun yönetiminde yer alan 57 aile üyesi dahil edilmiştir. Sonuçlar yaşlı nesil aile üyelerinin genç nesile kıyasla daha büyük bir yüzdesinin holdingin ve halka açık bağlı şirketlerinin yönetim kurullarında bulunduğunu, buna karşılık genç nesil aile üyelerinin daha büyük bir yüzdesinin bağlı şirketlerde icracı görevlerde bulunduğunu göstermektedir. Sahip ailelerin, aile işletme gruplarını holding ve bağlı şirket seviyelerinde yaygın bir katılımla yönettikleri görülmektedir. Sonuçlar hem yaşlı hem genç aile işletme gruplarında genç nesil aile üyelerinin istatistiksel olarak daha yüksek eğitim seviyesine ve daha fazla uluslararası tecrübeye sahip olduklarını göstermektedir.

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Cite This Article

YILDIRIM-ÖKTEM, Ö. (2010). GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN INVOLVEMENT OF FAMILY MEMBERS IN GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT OF TURKISH FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS AND BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY MEMBERS. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Cilt: 24 - Sayı: 1, 41–66. https://ajindex.com/articles/145831

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