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Journals / Amme İdaresi Dergisi / 2017 / Cilt: 50 - Sayı: 3

Do Different Forms of Governments Change Economic and Fiscal Outcomes? The Case of Turkey's Economy

Farklı Hükümet Biçimleri İktisadi ve Mali Sonuçları Değiştirir mi? Türkiye Ekonomisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme

TÜLİN ALTUN
Pages
27–66
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The results show that economic and fiscal recovery observed during the terms of miscellaneous governments are not affected by forms of governments, but are affected by stabilization programs.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This paper explores whether forms of government affected economic and fiscal outputs in Turkey during the period of 1950 to 2014.
📊
Key Findings & Data:At the same time, coalition governments are separated according to the ideological distance of coalition parties.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:The results show that economic and fiscal recovery observed during the terms of miscellaneous governments are not affected by forms of governments, but are affected by stabilization programs.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2014 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

This paper explores whether forms of government affected economic and fiscal outputs in Turkey during the period of 1950 to 2014. Based on the issues of decision-making and accountability, governments are classified as a one party/coalition government. At the same time, coalition governments are separated according to the ideological distance of coalition parties. It has not been found that forms of governments affect economic stability and fiscal discipline. The results show that economic and fiscal recovery observed during the terms of miscellaneous governments are not affected by forms of governments, but are affected by stabilization programs.

Özet

Bu çalışmada, 1950-2014 döneminde, Türkiye'de hükümet biçimlerinin iktisadi ve mali çıktıları etkileyip etkilemediği araştırılmıştır. Karar alma ve hesap verebilirlik sorunları temelinde, hükümetler, tek parti/koalisyon hükümeti şeklinde sınıflandırılmıştır. Aynı zamanda koalisyon hükümetleri, koalisyon partilerinin ideolojik uzaklığına göre bir ayrıma tabi tutulmuştur. Hükümet biçimlerinin ekonomik istikrarı ya da mali disiplini etkilediğine dair bir bulguya ulaşılamamıştır. Çeşitli hükümet dönemlerinde gözlemlenen ekonomik ve mali iyileşmelerin, hükümetlerin biçiminden değil, istikrar programlarından kaynaklandığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

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Cite This Article

ALTUN, T. (2017). Do Different Forms of Governments Change Economic and Fiscal Outcomes? The Case of Turkey's Economy. Amme İdaresi Dergisi, Cilt: 50 - Sayı: 3, 27–66. https://ajindex.com/articles/145023

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