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Journals / Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies / 2012 / Cilt: 26 - Sayı: 1

Piyasa Hakimiyetini Devam Ettirebilecek Tekele Karşı Düopol Piyasa Yapıları Durumlarında Uygulanması Gereken Devlet Politikaları

The Public Policy Implications of the Persistence of a Monopoly Versus a Duopolistic Market

Ahmet ÖZÇAM
Pages
67–79
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

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⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

However, since the consumers’ benefits are higher under the two-firm market structure compared to those under the pure monopolist situation, it was interesting to examine the overall welfare results further.

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Objective & Hypothesis:In this paper, the welfare implications of a market environment where a new technology which reduces the cost of production that can be exploited by a preempting monopolist which obtains a patent or allows a potential entrant to share the market are investigated from a public policy point of view.
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Key Findings & Data:Therefore, the implicationsgovernment regulation are to allow the monopolist to reign if it introduces a significant technological cost reduction, and to promote the competition if the new cost-saving technology is small.
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Conclusion & Impact:However, since the consumers’ benefits are higher under the two-firm market structure compared to those under the pure monopolist situation, it was interesting to examine the overall welfare results further.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2007 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

In this paper, the welfare implications of a market environment where a new technology which reduces the cost of production that can be exploited by a preempting monopolist which obtains a patent or allows a potential entrant to share the market are investigated from a public policy point of view. The well known efficiency effect indicates thatprivate incentives of the monopolist are greater than those of a new entrant. However, since the consumers’ benefits are higher under the two-firm market structure compared to those under the pure monopolist situation, it was interesting to examine the overall welfare results further. In neither of these two market structures was the welfarethe society found to be uniformly superior to the other. Therefore, the implicationsgovernment regulation are to allow the monopolist to reign if it introduces a significant technological cost reduction, and to promote the competition if the new cost-saving technology is small. An example from Turkey is given where in 2007 Royal Dutch Shell won a tender and acquired a portion of piped gas distribution from a giant Turkish formerly monopolist state company. the of for

Özet

Bu çalışmada, üretim maliyetini azaltıcı yeni bir teknolojinin patentine başkalarından önce davranarak sahip olan ve istismar gücünü kullanan mevcut bir tekel ile piyasaya potansiyel ikinci bir firmanın girmesine izin veren bir tekelci piyasa ortamlarında sosyal refah neticeleri devlet politikaları açısından incelenmiştir. İyi bilinmektedir ki verimlilik etkisine göre mevcut tekelin özel dürtüsü piyasaya girebilecek yeni firmanınkinden daha fazladır. Ancak, tüketici fazlası düopol piyasa şeklinde tekel durumuna göre daha çok olduğu göz önünde bulundurulursa, genel sosyal refah neticelerinin biraz daha fazla araştırılmasının ilgi çekeceği düşünülmüştür. Bu iki piyasa şeklinin hiç birinde sosyal refah neticelerinin diğer piyasa şekline mukayeseyle yeknesak bir şekilde üstün olmadığı bulunmuştur. Dolayısıyla, düzenleyici devlet açısından tekelcinin piyasada

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Cite This Article

ÖZÇAM, A. (2012). Piyasa Hakimiyetini Devam Ettirebilecek Tekele Karşı Düopol Piyasa Yapıları Durumlarında Uygulanması Gereken Devlet Politikaları. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Cilt: 26 - Sayı: 1, 67–79. https://ajindex.com/articles/144333

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