Journals / Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies / 2013 / Cilt: 27 - Sayı: 1

Hannah Arendt’in Yargı Teorisinde Aktör ve İzleyicinin Yargı Kapasiteleri Özet

Judgment Capacities of the Actor and the Spectator in Hannah Arendt's Theory of Judgment

Pages
85–106
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The judgment capacities of the actor and the spectator have a complementary function in preserving plurality in the public realm, and, as such, they are part of the vita activa.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The argument has been made that in her later works Arendt finally subsumes judging as a thinking activity under the vita contemplativa rather than as part of action in the vita activa.
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Key Findings & Data:This article argues against this interpretation of Arendt’s unfinished theory of judgment defended specifically by Ronald Beiner and Richard Bernstein.
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Conclusion & Impact:The judgment capacities of the actor and the spectator have a complementary function in preserving plurality in the public realm, and, as such, they are part of the vita activa.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

The argument has been made that in her later works Arendt finally subsumes judging as a thinking activity under the vita contemplativa rather than as part of action in the vita activa. This article argues against this interpretation of Arendt’s unfinished theory of judgment defended specifically by Ronald Beiner and Richard Bernstein. Judgment as representative and imaginative thinking remains part of the vita activa because, as distinct from philosophical thinking that is solitary, judgment is communal. Judgment always depends upon the presence of others in a particular public sphere, and in the act of judging an individual is actually engaged in creating a community of those judging. The judgment capacities of the actor and the spectator have a complementary function in preserving plurality in the public realm, and, as such, they are part of the vita activa.

Özet

Bu makalede Ronald Beiner ve Richard Bernstein tarafından öne sürülen, Arendt’in son dönem eserlerinde yargılamayı eylemin bir parçası olarak vita activa’nın içerisinde değerlendirmekten ziyade düşünsel etkinlik olarak vita contemplativa’nın altında sınıflandırdığı savı eleştirilmektedir. Temsili ve imgesel düşünme biçimi olarak yargı, vita activa’ın içerisinde kalmaya devam etmektedir; çünkü yalnızlık gerektiren felsefi düşünmeden farklı olarak yargı, kendinden başkalarıyla birarada olmayı gerektirmek- tedir. Yargı, her zaman belirli bir kamusal alandaki başkalarının varlığınına bağlıdır ve yargılama eylemini gerçekleştiren birey aslında yargılayanlardan oluşan bir topluluğunun yaratılmasına dahil olmaktadır. Aktör ve izleyicinin yargı kapasiteleri, kamusal alandaki çoğulluğun muhafaza edilmesinde birbirlerini tamamlayıcı işlev görürler ve bu nedenle her ikisi de vita activa’ın parçasıdır.

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Cite This Article

RUSSELL, Ö. Ç. (2013). Hannah Arendt’in Yargı Teorisinde Aktör ve İzleyicinin Yargı Kapasiteleri Özet. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Cilt: 27 - Sayı: 1, 85–106. https://ajindex.com/articles/143783

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References (6)

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