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Journals / Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies / 2016 / Cilt: 30 - Sayı: 1

Stratejik İletişim ve İkna Üzerine Bir İnceleme

A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion

AYÇA ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY
Pages
1–21
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The goal is to provide a systematic categorization of the different approaches in the literature, accompanied with the discussions of the pioneer and leading papers as well as the frontier research in each of the categories.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This survey paper presents an extended literature review of strategic communication and persuasion.
📊
Key Findings & Data:This survey paper presents an extended literature review of strategic communication and persuasion.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:The goal is to provide a systematic categorization of the different approaches in the literature, accompanied with the discussions of the pioneer and leading papers as well as the frontier research in each of the categories.
🔬Design:Survey & Empirical Study
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

This survey paper presents an extended literature review of strategic communication and persuasion. The goal is to provide a systematic categorization of the different approaches in the literature, accompanied with the discussions of the pioneer and leading papers as well as the frontier research in each of the categories.

Özet

Bu inceleme çalışması, stratejik iletişim ve ikna etme üzerine detaylı bir literatür taraması sunmaktadır. Araştırmanın amacı literatürdeki farklı yaklaşımların sistematik bir sınıflandırmasını yaparken, her bir kategoride öne çıkan çalışmaları, belirleyici ve öncü makaleleri tartışmaları ile ortaya koymaktır.

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Cite This Article

ATABAY, A. Ö. (2016). Stratejik İletişim ve İkna Üzerine Bir İnceleme. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Cilt: 30 - Sayı: 1, 1–21. https://ajindex.com/articles/142682

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