Journals / Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies / 2016 / Cilt: 30 - Sayı: 2

İstemci-Sunucu'ya karşılık Eşler Arası

Client-Server versus Peer-to-Peer

Pages
37–57
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

When the server however, has convex costs, we show that the optimal network structure depends on the system parameters and there is no single distribution mechanism that provides the optimal server profit for every operating point of the network

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:This study identifies optimal transmission mechanisms for a video streaming service in a peer-to-peer network structure under different payment mechanisms: pay as you watch and pay upfront.
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Key Findings & Data:We calculate a uniform, feasible service price using the utilities of the users and associated server profits for every possible peer-to-peer distribution tree.
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Conclusion & Impact:When the server however, has convex costs, we show that the optimal network structure depends on the system parameters and there is no single distribution mechanism that provides the optimal server profit for every operating point of the network
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

This study identifies optimal transmission mechanisms for a video streaming service in a peer-to-peer network structure under different payment mechanisms: pay as you watch and pay upfront. We calculate a uniform, feasible service price using the utilities of the users and associated server profits for every possible peer-to-peer distribution tree. We prove that when the server has linear or concave costs, the client-server structure is more profitable than any peer-to-peer structure. This statement holds even when the users have maximal tolerance to indefinitely long pre-roll delays. When the server however, has convex costs, we show that the optimal network structure depends on the system parameters and there is no single distribution mechanism that provides the optimal server profit for every operating point of the network

Özet

Bu çalışma, eşler arası ağ yapısı altında farklı ödeme mekanizmaları (izlerken öde ve önceden öde) ile bir video akışı hizmeti için en iyi dağıtım mekanizmalarını belirlemektedir. Kullanıcıların faydaları ve sunucunun bunlara denk gelen karlarını kullanarak her bir olası eşler arası dağıtım ağacı için tekdüze olurlu bir fiyat hesaplanmaktadır. Sunucunun doğrusal veya içbükey maliyetlere sahip olması durumunda, istemci-sunucu yapısının, herhangi bir eşler arası yapıya göre daha karlı olduğunu ispatlanmıştır. Bu ifade kullanıcıların yayın öncesi gecikmelere karşı azami toleransa sahip oldukları durumda dahi geçerliliğini korumaktadır. Sunucunun dışbükey maliyetlere sahip olduğu durumda ise en iyi ağ yapısının sistem parametrelerine bağlı olduğu ve ağın her bir işletim noktası için en çok sunucu karını sağlayan tek bir dağıtım mekanizmasının olmadığı gösterilmiştir.

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Cite This Article

ÖZENER, B. A., SUNAY, M. O. (2016). İstemci-Sunucu'ya karşılık Eşler Arası. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Cilt: 30 - Sayı: 2, 37–57. https://ajindex.com/articles/142678

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