AI Summary & Key Takeaways
AI InsightIn conclusion, Jasper’s philosophy shows that transcendence is not an object to be known, but a horizon that orients human existence without ever being fully graspable.
📌 3 Key Takeaways
Abstract
This article examines the concept of philosophical belief (philosophischer Glaube) in Karl Jaspers through two interconnected lines of tension: the relationship between philosophy and religion, and that between philosophy and science. Although Jaspers is frequently situated within the tradition of existentialist thought, his philosophical project resists being reduced to any single tradition, not least because he attempts to articulate a conception of belief that neither coincides with religious dogma nor dissolves into scientific rationalism. In this respect, the study seeks to clarify whether Jaspers’ notion of philosophical belief constitutes an alternative to religion or, rather, a critical standpoint that reinterprets both religion and science within the horizon of human existence. The first part of the article addresses the tension between philosophy and religion by analyzing the traditional dichotomies of reason and faith, as well as of knowledge and belief. Rather than accepting these oppositions as fixed, Jaspers reconfigures them within an existential framework. Religious belief, in its historical and institutional forms, tends toward dogmatization, whereas philosophy risks losing its depth when confined to purely immanent rationality. Jasper’s notion of philosophical belief emerges precisely at this intersection—not as a synthesis in the strict sense, but as a mode of existential orientation that preserves transcendence without objectifying it. Accordingly, belief is reducible neither to subjective conviction nor to objective propositional content; instead, it expresses a mode of being that unfolds within the tension between subject and object. In this context, the article highlights Jaspers’ reinterpretation of transcendence as the “Encompassing” (das Umgreifende), which cannot be grasped as an object yet is nonetheless experienced in boundary situations. Philosophical belief, therefore, does not aim at demonstrative proof or certainty, but at existential elucidation. Jaspers’ well-known distinction, “Bruno believed, Galileo knew,” illustrates the epistemological difference between metaphysical commitment and scientific knowledge without subordinating one to the other. The second part of the study examines Jaspers’ critique of modern science, particularly his opposition to positivism, which he characterizes as a “new science” that has itself become a belief. While affirming the indispensability of scientific knowledge, Jaspers argues that the objectifying tendency inherent in science cannot exhaust the meaning of human existence. When science lays claim to total explanatory authority, it risks transforming into an ideological structure that suppresses transcendence. Against such absolutization, philosophical reflection reopens the question of meaning itself by situating scientific knowledge within the broader horizon of existence. Methodologically, the study employs conceptual analysis alongside a close reading of Jaspers’ texts, aiming to reconstruct the internal coherence of his thought rather than imposing external categorizations upon it. By engaging in comparative analysis with the domains of religion and science, the article demonstrates that philosophical belief functions not as a doctrinal position but as a critical and mediating stance. In conclusion, Jasper’s philosophy shows that transcendence is not an object to be known, but a horizon that orients human existence without ever being fully graspable. His concept of philosophical belief offers a way to navigate a path between dogmatic religion and reductive scientism, preserving the openness of meaning and the freedom of existential self-understanding. In doing so, it contributes to contemporary debates concerning the limits of knowledge, the role of faith, and the possibility of a non-dogmatic relation to transcendence.
Özet
Bu çalışma, Karl Jaspers’in felsefi inanç kavramını, din-felsefe ve bilim-felsefe ilişkileri bağlamında incelemektedir. Jaspers’in düşüncesi, inancı ne dinsel dogma ile özdeşleştirmekte ne de bilimsel bilginin sınırları içine hapsetmektedir. Bu bağlamda çalışma, felsefi inancın dinin alternatifi mi yoksa din ve bilimi eleştirel bir zeminde yeniden yorumlayan bir imkân mı olduğu sorusunu tartışmaya açmaktadır. Araştırmada, akıl-iman ve bilgi-inanç karşıtlıklarının Jaspers tarafından nasıl dönüştürüldüğü ele alınmakta; özellikle aşkınlığın nesneleştirilemezliği ve “kuşatan” kavramı üzerinden felsefi inancın varoluşsal bir yönelim biçimi olduğu gösterilmektedir. Ayrıca Jaspers’in pozitivizm eleştirisi çerçevesinde bilimin mutlaklaştırılmasına karşı geliştirdiği yaklaşım analiz edilmektedir. Yöntem olarak kavramsal çözümleme ve metin yorumlamaya dayanan bu çalışma, Jaspers’in felsefi inanç kavramının doktriner bir yapıdan ziyade, anlamı açık tutan ve insan varoluşunu aşkınlık ufkunda konumlandıran eleştirel bir imkân olarak okunabileceğini ileri sürmektedir. Çalışmada felsefi inanç kavramının dinin alternatifi olan yeni bir inanç biçimi değil, din ile bilimi kendi sınırları içinde eleştirel olarak yeniden konumlandıran ve felsefi düşünmenin sınır bilinci içinde gerçekleşen varoluşsal bir düşünme imkânı olduğu görülmüştür. Bununla birlikte, aşkınlığın insan varoluşuna içkin mi yoksa aşkın bir referans alanı mı olduğu sorusu, Jaspers’in düşüncesinin hâlâ tartışmaya açık yönlerinden biridir.