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Journals / Uluslararası Ekonomi ve Yenilik Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 12 Sayı: 2

Mirror Trade Value Gaps and the Determinants of Potential Misinvoicing in Türkiye’s Foreign Trade: An Augmented Gravity Model Approach (2010-2024)

Türkiye’nin Dış Ticaretinde Ayna Ticaret Değer Açıkları ve Potansiyel Yanlış Faturalandırmanın Belirleyicileri: Genişletilmiş Bir Çekim Modeli Yaklaşımı (2010-2024)

Nihat Dağıstan(BAŞKENT ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0001-9086-4942
Pages
881–908
Publication Date
2026-10-01
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Results are robust to τ and sample choices.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:Trade misinvoicing is a principal channel of illicit financial flows in developing economies, yet its correlates have not been tested for Türkiye on a broad partner panel.
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Key Findings & Data:Using mirror statistics computed with parameters consistent with Global Financial Integrity’s value-gap approach (τ = 0.06; matched records only), this study examines the determinants of bilateral mirror trade value gaps-read as indicators of potential misinvoicing rather than as evidence of deliberate misreporting-within an augmented gravity framework estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood on 2,506 partner-year observations covering 169 partners over 2010-2024.
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Conclusion & Impact:Results are robust to τ and sample choices.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:2010-2024 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Ticaretin yanlış faturalandırılması · Yasa dışı finansal akımlar · Çekim modeli

Abstract

Trade misinvoicing is a principal channel of illicit financial flows in developing economies, yet its correlates have not been tested for Türkiye on a broad partner panel. Using mirror statistics computed with parameters consistent with Global Financial Integrity’s value-gap approach (τ = 0.06; matched records only), this study examines the determinants of bilateral mirror trade value gaps-read as indicators of potential misinvoicing rather than as evidence of deliberate misreporting-within an augmented gravity framework estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood on 2,506 partner-year observations covering 169 partners over 2010-2024. Flows scale with economic size and geography; a 10-point increase in a partner’s financial secrecy score is associated with approximately 43 percent higher gross flows, and a one-point increase in the tariff burden with about 21 percent higher import under-invoicing. Determinants diverge across flow types: tax-erosion-related gaps concentrate in high-institutional-quality EU partners, while capital-exit-related gaps concentrate in weakly governed partners and secrecy jurisdictions. In exploratory extensions, outflow-oriented gaps are higher in general election years and co-move with Türkiye’s CDS premium and the corporate tax rate differential; year-level randomization tests do not confirm these coefficients, so they are reported as exploratory associations. Results are robust to τ and sample choices.

Özet

Ticaretin yanlış faturalandırılması, gelişmekte olan ekonomilerde yasa dışı finansal akımların başat kanallarından biridir; ancak olgunun hangi ülke ve ilişki özellikleriyle ilişkili olduğu Türkiye için bugüne dek geniş kapsamlı bir ticaret ortağı paneli kullanılarak sınanmamıştır. Bu çalışma, Türkiye’nin 169 ortağıyla 2010-2024 dönemini kapsayan 2.506 ortak-yıl gözlemli panelde, Global Financial Integrity’nin değer açığı yaklaşımıyla uyumlu parametrelerle (τ = 0,06; yalnız eşleşmiş kayıtlar) ayna istatistiklerinden türetilen değer açığı akımlarının - kasıtlı yanlış beyanın doğrudan kanıtı olarak değil, potansiyel yanlış faturalandırma göstergesi olarak okunan - belirleyicilerini genişletilmiş bir çekim modeli çerçevesinde ve PPML tahmincisiyle incelemektedir. Akımlar ekonomik büyüklük ve coğrafyayla ölçeklenmekte; ortağın finansal gizlilik skorundaki 10 puanlık artış brüt akımın yaklaşık %43, tarife yükündeki bir puanlık artış ithalat eksik faturalandırmasının, trend kontrolü altında, yaklaşık %21 daha yüksek olmasıyla ilişkilidir. Belirleyiciler akım türleri arasında ayrışmaktadır: vergi erozyonuyla ilişkili açıklar kurumsal kalitenin yüksek olduğu AB ortaklarında, sermaye çıkışıyla ilişkili açıklar zayıf kurumsal ortamlarda ve gizlilik merkezlerinde yoğunlaşmaktadır. Keşifsel katmanda genel seçim yıllarında çıkış yönlü akımlar yaklaşık beşte bir daha yüksek ölçülmekte (yerel seçim karşılaştırması etkisizdir), Türkiye’nin CDS primi yükseldiğinde çıkışlar gizlilik merkezleriyle ilişkilenmekte ve kurumlar vergisi oranı farkı ithalat fazla faturalandırmasıyla ilişkilenmektedir (kesitsel kimliklendirme); yıl-düzeyi rastgeleleştirme testleri siyasal-takvim katsayılarını doğrulamadığından bu örüntüler ana bulgu olarak değil keşifsel ilişkiler olarak raporlanmakta, varlık barışı yıllarındaki artış yalnızca zayıf düzeyde anlamlı kalmaktadır. Sonuçlar τ ve örneklem duyarlılıklarına dayanıklıdır.

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Cite This Article

Dağıstan, N. (2026). Mirror Trade Value Gaps and the Determinants of Potential Misinvoicing in Türkiye’s Foreign Trade: An Augmented Gravity Model Approach (2010-2024). Uluslararası Ekonomi ve Yenilik Dergisi, Cilt: 12 Sayı: 2, 881–908. https://doi.org/10.20979/ueyd.2017605

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