Journals / Ombudsman Akademik / 2026 / Sayı: ÖZEL SAYI 3 (AİLE) Özel Sayı

THE DIVORCE PHENOMENON IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE AND ASYMMETRIC APPROACHES

İktisadi Açıdan Boşanma Olgusu ve Bakışımsız Yaklaşımlar

İrfan Kalaycı(İnönü Ünüversitesi)0000-0002-9323-8944
Pages
47–89
Publication Date
2025-11-27
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In addition, the third asymmetric approach, “game theory”, can be used to prevent spouses from getting divorced or to reduce the number (rate) of divorces.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The subject and purpose of this study is to examine the “divorce” phenomenon, which is a serious socioeconomic problematic, with three asymmetrical approaches in the background of theoretic causes-results relationship (determinism).
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Key Findings & Data:Divorce, which means the official end of a marriage, consists of a series of stages with material and spiritual content.
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Conclusion & Impact:In addition, the third asymmetric approach, “game theory”, can be used to prevent spouses from getting divorced or to reduce the number (rate) of divorces.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Boşanma · İktisadi Nedenler - Sonuçlar · GZFT

Abstract

The subject and purpose of this study is to examine the “divorce” phenomenon, which is a serious socioeconomic problematic, with three asymmetrical approaches in the background of theoretic causes-results relationship (determinism). Divorce, which means the official end of a marriage, consists of a series of stages with material and spiritual content. There are many reasons for divorce (financial incompatibility, physical/psychological violence, adultery-infid-elity, unemployment, dissatisfaction, financial crises, etc.) and many results (family breakup, impoverishment, inefficiency at work, migration, committing crime, immorality, etc.). The reasons and results in question can replace each other or be transitive between them depending on the situation and time. The phenomenon of divorce, as the first asymmetric approach, has a multi-faceted “SWOT” (strengths – weaknesses – opportunities – threats) dimension. In countries / societies where gender inequality and injustice are widespread and effective, women are relatively more oppressed among divorced couples. In order to improve human rights in favor of women in the male-dominated order, the second asymmetric approach, “feminist economics / economy”, has become popular. This approach can be considered as a paradigmatic change in the value set due to the need for gender equality and justice, which is also valid in the divorce problem. In addition, the third asymmetric approach, “game theory”, can be used to prevent spouses from getting divorced or to reduce the number (rate) of divorces.

Özet

Bu çalışmanın konusu ve amacı, ciddi bir sosyo-ekonomik sorunsal olan “boşanma” olgusunu kuramsal neden-sonuç ilişkisi (determinizm) arka-planında üç bakışımsız (asimetrik) yaklaşımla incelemektir. Evliliğin resmen bitmesi demek olan boşanma, maddi ve manevi içerikli bir dizi evreden oluşur. Boşanmanın birçok nedeni (parasal geçimsizlik, fiziksel / psikolojik şiddet, aldatma / zina, işsizlik, tatminsizlik, mali krizler, vs.) ve birçok sonucu (ailenin dağılması, yoksullaşma, işte verimsizlik, göç, suç işleme, ahlaksızlık, vs.) vardır. Sözkonusu nedenler ve sonuçlar, duruma ve zamana göre birbirini ikame edebilir ya da aralarında geçişken olabilirler. Boşanma olgusu, ilk bakışımsız yaklaşım olarak çok yönlü bir “GZFT” (güçlü – zayıf – fırsat - tehdit) boyutuna sahiptir. Toplumsal cinsiyet eşitsizliği ve adaletsizliğinin yaygın ve etkili olduğu ülkelerde / toplumlarda boşanan çiftlerden görece kadınlar daha fazla ezilmektedir. Eril egemen düzende insan haklarının kadınların lehine iyileştirilmesi için ikinci bakışımsız yaklaşım olarak “feminist iktisat” öne çıkarak popüler olmuştur. Bu yaklaşım, boşanma sorunsalında da geçerli olan toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği ve adaleti ihtiyacından dolayı değerler dizisinde (paradigmatik) bir değişim olarak kabul edilebilir. Ayrıca, eşlerin boşanmaması ya da boşanma sayısının (oranının) düşürülmesi için üçüncü bir bakışımsız yaklaşım olarak “oyun kuramı” seçeneğine de başvurulabilir.

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Cite This Article

Kalaycı, İ. (2025). THE DIVORCE PHENOMENON IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE AND ASYMMETRIC APPROACHES. Ombudsman Akademik, Sayı: ÖZEL SAYI 3 (AİLE) Özel Sayı, 47–89. https://doi.org/10.32002/ombudsmanakademik.1707627

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