Journals / Doğuş Üniversitesi Dergisi / 2009 / Cilt: 10 - Sayı: 1

Ceo Turnover and Financial Report Manipulations

Yönetim Değişikliği ve Finansal Rapor Manipülasyonları

Pages
1–10
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

As a result, it is found that some types of manipulation might happen related to some study variables ; and beside others, the mostly preferred variables are general managerial costs and long term debts.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This paper interrogates if a manipulation exists in the financial statements of ISE (Istanbul Stock Exchange) traded companies due to the changes of their CEOs in the period of 1998-2003.
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Key Findings & Data:Analysis of variance has been conducted to clarify if the study variables have significant mean differences among those companies that changed their CEOs and those that did not.
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Conclusion & Impact:As a result, it is found that some types of manipulation might happen related to some study variables ; and beside others, the mostly preferred variables are general managerial costs and long term debts.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2003 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

This paper interrogates if a manipulation exists in the financial statements of ISE (Istanbul Stock Exchange) traded companies due to the changes of their CEOs in the period of 1998-2003. Analysis of variance has been conducted to clarify if the study variables have significant mean differences among those companies that changed their CEOs and those that did not. As a result, it is found that some types of manipulation might happen related to some study variables ; and beside others, the mostly preferred variables are general managerial costs and long term debts.

Özet

Bu çalışmada İMKB’nda işlem gören firmalarda 1998-2003 yılları arasında yönetim değişikliğini takip eden yıllarda finansal raporlarda bir manipülasyonun var olup olmadığı araştırılmıştır. Analiz yöntemi olarak varyans analizi seçilmiş ve ilgili değişkenlerin yönetim değişikliği olan ve olmayan firmalardaki değerleri arasında bir fark olup olmadığı incelenmiştir. Yapılan analizler neticesinde her dönem farklı bir takım değişkenler ile manipülasyonun olduğu yönünde bulgular sağlanmıştır. Diğerlerine göre daha çok tercih edilen değişkenler olarak; genel yönetim giderleri ve uzun dönemli borç bulunmuştur.

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Cite This Article

AREN, S. (2009). Ceo Turnover and Financial Report Manipulations. Doğuş Üniversitesi Dergisi, Cilt: 10 - Sayı: 1, 1–10. https://ajindex.com/articles/128673

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References (1)

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