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Journals / Sosyoekonomi / 2026 / Cilt: 34 Sayı: 69

Why Do Some Civilisations Collapse? An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Societal Decline

Bazı Uygarlıklar Neden Yok Olur? Toplumsal Çöküşün Evrimsel Oyun Teorik Modeli

Aras Yolusever(İSTANBUL KÜLTÜR ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0001-9810-2571
Pages
115–144
Publication Date
2026-07-31
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Findings indicate that societies with adaptive institutions and sustainable cooperation tend to ensure their survival, while those that ignore harmful dynamics risk collapse.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The collapse of civilisations is a recurring theme in human history.
📊
Key Findings & Data:Historical case studies are quantitatively analysed to corroborate the theoretical framework.
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Conclusion & Impact:Findings indicate that societies with adaptive institutions and sustainable cooperation tend to ensure their survival, while those that ignore harmful dynamics risk collapse.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Evrimsel Oyun Teorisi · Çoğaltıcı Dinamikler · Toplumsal Çöküş

Abstract

The collapse of civilisations is a recurring theme in human history. This paper formalises the concept of societal decline through the lens of evolutionary game theory (EGT) and replicator dynamics, illustrating how interactions among competing social groups, such as elites, commoners, and external forces, can produce feedback loops that lead to collapse. Historical case studies are quantitatively analysed to corroborate the theoretical framework. Graphics demonstrate how resource depletion, inequality, and institutional fragility create conditions conducive to collapse. Findings indicate that societies with adaptive institutions and sustainable cooperation tend to ensure their survival, while those that ignore harmful dynamics risk collapse.

Özet

Uygarlıkların çöküşü, insanlık tarihinin tekrar eden bir temasıdır. Bu makale, toplumsal çöküş kavramını evrimsel oyun teorisi (EOT) ve çoğaltıcı dinamikler çerçevesinde biçimlendirerek, elitler, sıradan halk ve dış güçler gibi rekabet hâlindeki sosyal gruplar arasındaki etkileşimlerin çöküşe yol açan geri besleme döngüleri oluşturabileceğini göstermektedir. Çalışmada tarihî vaka çalışmaları teorik çerçevenin geçerliliğini desteklemek amacıyla nicel olarak analiz edilmiştir. Grafikler, kaynakların tükenmesi, eşitsizlik ve kurumsal kırılganlık gibi unsurların çöküşe elverişli koşullar yarattığını ortaya koymaktadır. Bulgular, uyum sağlayabilen kurumlara ve sürdürülebilir iş birliğine sahip toplumların varlıklarını sürdürme eğiliminde olduğunu, zararlı dinamikleri görmezden gelenlerin ise çöküş riski taşıdığını göstermektedir.

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Cite This Article

Yolusever, A. (2026). Why Do Some Civilisations Collapse? An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Societal Decline. Sosyoekonomi, Cilt: 34 Sayı: 69, 115–144. https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2026.03.05

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