Journals / Anadolu Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi / 2026 / Volume: 27 Issue: 1

THE U.S. ARMS SALES AND FOREIGN POLICY: TURKİYE’S AND GREECE’S FIGHTERS CASE

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Publication Date
2026-03-26
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Türkiye is a NATO member and the U.S.’ refusal to give it F-35 warfighters and its protracted denial of Türkiye’s request to upgrade its F-16 aircraft raise serious questions about NATO's capacity to protect Türkiye, and ambiguity in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The United States (U.S.) is the largest exporter of weaponry worldwide.
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Key Findings & Data:The U.S. approved Greece's modernization of F-16 warplanes, which could change the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, but Türkiye’s similar request for the same was not accepted.
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Conclusion & Impact:Türkiye is a NATO member and the U.S.’ refusal to give it F-35 warfighters and its protracted denial of Türkiye’s request to upgrade its F-16 aircraft raise serious questions about NATO's capacity to protect Türkiye, and ambiguity in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2009 Verileri
⚙️Variables:The U.S. · Türkiye · Greece

Abstract

The United States (U.S.) is the largest exporter of weaponry worldwide. The U.S. arms sales can be used as a lens to analyze its foreign and security policy in international relations. The U.S. does not favor using arms exports solely to maximize financial gain. The U.S. approved Greece's modernization of F-16 warplanes, which could change the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, but Türkiye’s similar request for the same was not accepted. The U.S. has also ratified the sale of F-35 warplanes to Greece, an offensive air weapon that is invisible to radar. This article examines US arms sales and restrictions to numerous states, including Türkiye and Greece, as a case study comparing the modernization of F-16 aircraft and F-35 arms sales from 2009 to 2024. We get all the needed data from the U.S. Security Defense Cooperation institution's official website. Türkiye is a NATO member and the U.S.’ refusal to give it F-35 warfighters and its protracted denial of Türkiye’s request to upgrade its F-16 aircraft raise serious questions about NATO's capacity to protect Türkiye, and ambiguity in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.

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Cite This Article

Alkanalka, M. (2026). THE U.S. ARMS SALES AND FOREIGN POLICY: TURKİYE’S AND GREECE’S FIGHTERS CASE. Anadolu Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Volume: 27 Issue: 1. https://doi.org/10.53443/anadoluibfd.1721872

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