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Journals / Hitit Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi / 2026 / Volume: 7 Issue: 1

WAS THE INDIAN MUTINY CONSEQUENCE OF THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BRITISH INFORMATION SYSTEM?

Serkan Baykuşoglu
Pages
139–153
Publication Date
2014-08-05
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

If the British authorities had sufficient and accurate information before the revolt occurred, this would not happen as the Empire’s military power was strong enough to prevent such incident

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The Indian Mutiny has an important place in British Colonial History.
📊
Key Findings & Data:There were various causes of this rebellion but this research, which was based on the original historical documents, showed that the main reason was the breakdown of the British Information System.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:If the British authorities had sufficient and accurate information before the revolt occurred, this would not happen as the Empire’s military power was strong enough to prevent such incident
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Hindistan İsyanı · İngiliz Yönetimi · İnformasyon Sistemi

Abstract

The Indian Mutiny has an important place in British Colonial History. There were various causes of this rebellion but this research, which was based on the original historical documents, showed that the main reason was the breakdown of the British Information System. This study also considered other aspects which played role in the mutiny such as delay in construction of telegraphic system and railways. Thus, the British government realised that a controlled information line in Indian as well as between India and Great Britain was vital. There was some improvement in governmental communications between the two countries but existence of the electric telegraph line was still slow and unreliable. Over thirty thousand soldiers including Muslims and Hindus rebelled together against the British authority. It spread out to other regions in Northern India involving princes and peasants. If the British authorities had sufficient and accurate information before the revolt occurred, this would not happen as the Empire’s military power was strong enough to prevent such incident

Özet

Hint Ayaklanması İngiliz Sömürgecilik Tarihi’nde önemli bir yere sahiptir. Bu isyanın birçok sebebleri vardır ancak orijinal tarihi kaynaklara dayalı olarak yapılan bu geniş çaplı araştırma isyanın asıl sebebinin İngiliz iletişim sisteminin çöküşünden dolayı olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu araştırma aynı zamanda telegraf ve tren hatlarının inşasının gecikmesi gibi isyanda rol oynayan diğer sebebleri de değerlendirmiştir. Böylece İngiliz hükümeti Hindistan ve Büyük Britanya arasındaki iletişim hattının yanısıra Hindistan içinde de kontrollü informasyon hattının öneminin farkına varmıştır. İki ülke arasındaki resmi iletişimde göze çarpan bir ilerleme görülsede o dönemde kullanımda olan telegraf hattı yavaş ve güvenilmezdi. Otuz binin üzerinde Müslüman ve Hintlilerin de içinde bulunduğu askerler hep birlikte İngiliz yönetimine karşı isyan ettiler. İsyan Kuzey Hindistan’daki diğer bölgelere ve bu bölgelerde yaşayan prenses ve köylüleri de içine alacak şekilde yayıldı. Eğer İngiliz yönetimi isyan öncesi yeterli ve düzenli bilgiye sahip olsaydı, isyan çıkmayabilirdi ki İmparatorluğun askeri birliği bu tür isyanları önleyebilecek bir güce sahibti.

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Cite This Article

Baykuşoglu, S. (2014). WAS THE INDIAN MUTINY CONSEQUENCE OF THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BRITISH INFORMATION SYSTEM?. Hitit Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Volume: 7 Issue: 1, 139–153. https://doi.org/10.17218/husbed.59665

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References (134)

  1. The other main centres of the rebellion were Allahabad, Mainpuru, Fatehgarh,
  2. Bareilly, Agra, Aligarh, Bulandshahr, and Delhi.
  3. “A telegraphic despatch received at Bombay from Meerut states that the 3d Bengal
  4. cavalry were in open Mutiny. Several officers and men had been killed and wounded” The
  5. Times, 8 June Monday 1857, p.9.
  6. First Earl of Beaconsfield (1804-1881), statesman and man of letters. see for
  7. more information: STEPHEN, Leslie (Sir) and LEE, Sidney (Sir). (1917), The
  8. Dictionary of National Biography, vol. V, Oxford University Press, p.1006.
  9. The Time’s Correspondent shared also same idea as Disraeli. He said, “The
  10. Mutiny is not instigated by any religious feeling. Every mutiny that has ever occurred in
  11. India has been apparently created by one of two causes a reduction of pay or an outrage on
  12. caste prejudice. The reason for that fact is simple enough. No other cause would ever induce
  13. three Sepoys to act together. They have no patriotism, for during 600 years they have had
  14. no country. They have no sense of a common interest in the common weal…” The Times,
  15. June Monday 1857, p.12.
  16. According to him there was lack of understanding between ruler and ruled
  17. and the British had failed to use Hindu-Muslim differences to ensure the loyalty
  18. of the army.
  19. Evidence to this, Sir George Digby Barker saying in his letter: “You may as well
  20. direct my letters to me at Benares to be forwarded, but at present all postal communication
  21. is cut off beyond Allahabad. The telegraph has been cut by these murderous hounds and
  22. made into slings to fire at us”, Barker, Sir George Digby (General), Letters from
  23. Persia ~ India 1857-1858, (edited by Lady Barker), G. Bell and Sons ltd., London, p.46.
  24. JAMES, Lawrance. (1997), Raj The Making and Unmaking of British India, Little
  25. Brown and Company (UK), London, p.5.
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  29. Ibid., p.366.
  30. Ibid., p.369.
  31. Ibid., p.165.
  32. BAIRD, J. G. A. (1911), Private Letters of the Marques of Dalhousie, William
  33. Blackwood and Sons, Edingurgh and London, p.119.
  34. He said that “In November last we began to lay the electric telegraph. Five
  35. days ago I received a message from Agra, 800 miles distant, transmitted in 1 hour
  36. and 50 minutes! And I have a few minutes ago read the heads of intelligence of
  37. your mail of 24th February by way of Bombay. In short time we shall complete
  38. the line to Bombay, and thus in a few months we shall reduced the period of communication with England from thirty-five to twenty-six days….We have
  39. already so improved communications that our last letter from Umerapoora was
  40. only nineteen days old. BAIRD, J.G.A. (1911), Private Letters of the Marques of
  41. Dalhousie, William Blackwood and Sons, Edingurgh and London, p.293. (Government
  42. House, March 30th 1854)
  43. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: 3rd series, vol. CXLIV, 3 February 1857-21
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  45. Ibid., 2427.
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  48. p.679.
  49. Ibid., p.677.
  50. In the present report, it is indeed hard to describe how useful the telegraph has
  51. proved to the Punjab administration during the crisis of 1857!… It were superfluous to
  52. mention the immense advantages which the Telegraph gave us over enemies. Suffice it to
  53. note the instance at Lahore, when the Authorities were warned by the telegraph of the
  54. Delhi disaster, disarmed the sepoys before they could obtain information by post. If there
  55. had been a telegraph, an outbreak at Lahore might possibly not have been averted at that
  56. moment. PRO 30/12/22, Supplement to the Overland Friend of India, General Report on
  57. the Administration of the Punjab Territories, For the Years 1856-57 & 1857-58, Jan 22, Section VI/Electric Telegraph/70, p.12.
  58. HOSKINS, H.L. (1966), British Routes to India, London, p.91.
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  63. PRO 30/12/22, Supplement to the Overland Friend of India, General Report
  64. on the Administration of the Punjab Territories, For the Years 1856-57 & 1857-58,
  65. Jan 22 1859, Section IV/Railroads/61, p.11.
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  69. January 22, 1859, Section IV, Part I-Roads, 55, p.10.
  70. University press, Oxford, p.91.
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  72. Press, p.372.
  73. PRO 30/12/22, Extracts of a letter from the Secret Committee of the Court
  74. of Directors of the East India Company to the Governor General of India in Council, dated 19th April 1858, relating to that “Proclamation” / 7th May 1858, p.4.
  75. The Proclamations is addressed to the Chiefs and Inhabitants of Oudh.
  76. The Delhi Gazette, Saturday, August 7, 1858, The founding; Ahmud Ally Khan’s
  77. defence was a complete failure, he merely asserts that he has never been faithful to the
  78. British Government, denies the correspondence with the king. See for more details about
  79. the charges which were made against the Nawab, PRO 30/12/22.
  80. PRO 30/29/23/10, Letter from Muttra, 9th June/320/321.
  81. Press, 1997, p.336.
  82. PRO 30/12/22, Her Majesty’s Proclamation Gazette, Governor-General’s
  83. Camp Extraordinary, Published by authority, Allahabad, Monday, 1st November, p.17. Under the heading of “The Right Honourable the Governor-General has
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  85. Proclamation of Her Majesty to the Princes, the Chiefs, and the People of India”.
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  87. Little, Brown and Company (UK), London, p.240.
  88. The Times, 15 June Monday 1857 (the Bengal Mutinies), p.12.
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  90. University press, p.26.
  91. Ibid., p.129.
  92. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: 3rd series, vol.CXLVI, 19th of June 1857 to
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  94. Ibid., 512-513.
  95. The Times, 10 June 1857, (Parliamentary Debates). The Earl of Ellenborough
  96. “you must have looked with apprehension at similar appearances of mutiny in the Madras
  97. and Bombay armies; but that which has most alarmed me, and which gives a more serious
  98. character to all these appearances of insubordination is that which has only come to our
  99. knowledge within the last few hours… I can not but think that there must have been some
  100. strange misrepresentation and exaggeration in the accounts which we have received from
  101. India… When the 19th Regiment was disbanded at Barrackpore there was a passage in
  102. a long official paper emanating from the Governor General in Council, and read to the
  103. soldiery, which was to the effect that no one could pretend that the Government had at
  104. any time endeavoured to interfere with the religion of the people; but I can not find that
  105. any notification has been made, as it should have been, at the quarters of every regiment
  106. and throughout the country… I see no trace of there have been any general notification to
  107. that effect. It has been left entirely to the officers at the different stations to make any such
  108. notification as they should think fit under the circumstances… And what should the course
  109. of the Governor General have been? Ought he not with his own hand in three sentences to
  110. have communicated to the whole country… I am convinced that if the Governor General
  111. had pursued that course we should have heard no more of the incendiary fires, nor of the
  112. open mutiny at Meerut. But that course was not taken…”
  113. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: 3rd series, vol. CXLVI, 19th of June 1857 to
  114. Ibid., 514.
  115. Gower, Granville (2nd Earl Granville), 1815-1891, politician. He was born
  116. to diplomacy (his father was British Ambassador in Paris in the 1830s). Look for
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  118. Who in British History, London, p.363.
  119. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: 3rd series, vol. CXLVI, 19th of June 1857
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  121. Sir Hugh Rose, He came from a line of politicians and diplomats, but was
  122. commissioned into the 92nd Highlanders in 1821. On the outbreak of the Mutiny
  123. he volunteered for service and was appointed to the Poona division. His campaign
  124. had done was to destroy the organised rebel armies and to occupy their bases.
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  128. PRO 30/12/22, The Indian Resolutions, Monday April 26 (The House of
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  131. PRO 30/29/23/10, Granville Papers, p.609.
  132. Press, p.97.
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