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Journals / Bilgi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 28 Sayı: 1

The Political Economy of Compliance: Why Do Individuals Obey Collective Rules?

Uyumun Politik Ekonomisi: Bireyler Kolektif Kurallara Neden İtaat Eder?

Aras Yolusever(İSTANBUL KÜLTÜR ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0001-9810-2571
Pages
22–46
Publication Date
2026-07-31
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Originality/Value- The study formalizes the micro-foundations of compliance by unifying rational choice, institutional trust, and network diffusion in one computational model, offering actionable in-sights for institutional design.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Purpose - To explain why individuals comply with collective rules by integrating multiple theoretical perspectives into a single framework, with applications ranging from tax compliance to public health mandates.
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Key Findings & Data:Methodology/Approach/Design- Drawing on rational choice theory, institutional economics, and behavioral science, the authors build an agent-based model (ABM) simulating 500 heterogeneous agents across small-world, scale-free, and random networks.
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Conclusion & Impact:Originality/Value- The study formalizes the micro-foundations of compliance by unifying rational choice, institutional trust, and network diffusion in one computational model, offering actionable in-sights for institutional design.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Kurumsal İktisat · İktisat Teorisi · Politik İktisat

Abstract

Purpose - To explain why individuals comply with collective rules by integrating multiple theoretical perspectives into a single framework, with applications ranging from tax compliance to public health mandates. Methodology/Approach/Design- Drawing on rational choice theory, institutional economics, and behavioral science, the authors build an agent-based model (ABM) simulating 500 heterogeneous agents across small-world, scale-free, and random networks. The model combines three compliance mechanisms: cost–benefit calculation, institutional trust, and social norm diffusion. Findings- Compliance emerges from the interaction of deterrence, trust, and peer influence rather than any single factor. BeTrust-building interventions prove more cost-effective than enforcement alone, and norm visibility campaigns amplify both. Originality/Value- The study formalizes the micro-foundations of compliance by unifying rational choice, institutional trust, and network diffusion in one computational model, offering actionable in-sights for institutional design.

Özet

Amaç – Çalışmanın amacı bireylerin kolektif kurallara neden uyduğunu açıklamak için farklı teorik perspektifleri tek bir çerçeve altında bütünleştirmek; vergi uyumundan halk sağlığı düzenlemelerine kadar geniş bir uygulama alanı sunmaktır. Yöntem/Metodoloji/Dizayn - Rasyonel tercih teorisi, kurumsal iktisat ve davranış bilimlerinden yararlanan çalışma, küçük dünya, ölçeksiz ve rastgele ağlarda yer alan 500 heterojen ajanı simüle eden bir ajan tabanlı model (ATM) geliştirmiştir. Model üç uyum mekanizmasını bir araya getirmektedir: fayda-maliyet hesabı, kurumsal güven ve sosyal normların yayılımı. Sonuçlar- Uyum ; caydırıcılık, güven ve akran etkisinin etkileşiminden ortaya çıkan olgudur; tek bir faktöre indirgenemez. Güven inşasına yönelik müdahalelerin, yalnızca yaptırıma dayalı stratejilere kıyasla daha yüksek maliyet etkinliği sağladığı; norm görünürlüğü kampanyalarının ise her iki yaklaşımın da etkisini güçlendirdiği görülmüştür. Katkı/Farklılıklar - Çalışma, rasyonel tercih, kurumsal güven ve ağ temelli yayılım yaklaşımlarının tek bir hesaplamalı modelde birleştirerek uyumun mikro temellerini biçimselleştirmektedir.

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Cite This Article

Yolusever, A. (2026). The Political Economy of Compliance: Why Do Individuals Obey Collective Rules?. Bilgi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt: 28 Sayı: 1, 22–46. https://doi.org/10.54838/bilgisosyal.1936887

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