Journals / Ufuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi / 2025 / Cilt: 14 Sayı: 28

Global Technology Standards And Geopolitical Competition: The Struggle to Set The Rules on 5G and Artificial Intelligence

KÜRESEL TEKNOLOJİ STANDARTLARI VE JEOPOLİTİK REKABET: 5G VE YAPAY ZEKÂ ÜZERİNDE KURAL KOYMA MÜCADELESİ

Pages
227–264
Publication Date
2025-12-31
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Findings indicate that “standard wars” are not merely technical rivalries but mechanisms of structural power generation and normative order-making.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Technology standards have evolved from technical coordination tools into strategic instruments shaping global governance and power competition.
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Key Findings & Data:This study examines how standard-setting in 5G and artificial intelligence (AI) reconfigures international order and governance mechanisms.
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Conclusion & Impact:Findings indicate that “standard wars” are not merely technical rivalries but mechanisms of structural power generation and normative order-making.
🔬Design:Teorik Makale
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Jeopolitik Rekabet · Rejim Kompleksi · Standartlar Hukuku

Abstract

Technology standards have evolved from technical coordination tools into strategic instruments shaping global governance and power competition. This study examines how standard-setting in 5G and artificial intelligence (AI) reconfigures international order and governance mechanisms. It argues that technology standards exert influence through three interrelated dynamics: first, by transforming technical specifications into geo-economic instruments that blur the line between security and economy; second, by undermining the neutrality of traditional standardization bodies and fostering competitive institutional blocs; and third, by enabling middle powers to exercise normative entrepreneurship within a fragmented global system. Using qualitative methods—document analysis and comparative case studies of ITU, 3GPP, OECD, and national policy frameworks—the paper adopts a regime complex perspective to trace institutional interplay and forum shifting. Findings indicate that “standard wars” are not merely technical rivalries but mechanisms of structural power generation and normative order-making. Policy implications highlight that middle powers can enhance strategic autonomy through multi-layered diplomacy and capacity-building in standards governance. Overall, the research situates technology standards as an underexplored yet pivotal dimension of contemporary international relations and global governance debates.

Özet

Teknoloji standartları, salt teknik uyum araçları olmaktan çıkarak küresel yönetişim ve güç rekabetinin merkezine yerleşmiştir. Bu çalışma, 5G ve yapay zekâ (YZ) alanlarındaki standart belirleme süreçlerinin uluslararası düzeni ve yönetişim mekanizmalarını nasıl yeniden şekillendirdiğini incelemektedir. Bulgular, teknoloji standartlarının üç temel dinamik üzerinden etkili olduğunu göstermektedir: Birincisi, teknik özellikleri jeoekonomik araçlara dönüştürerek güvenlik ve ekonomi sınırını bulanıklaştırması; ikincisi, geleneksel standart kurumlarının tarafsızlığını aşındırarak rekabetçi kurumsal blokların oluşumunu teşvik etmesi; üçüncüsü ise parçalı küresel sistemde orta güçlere normatif girişimcilik alanı açmasıdır. Nitel yöntemlerle, ITU, 3GPP, OECD ve ulusal politika belgeleri arasında karşılaştırmalı belge analizi yapılmış; “rejim kompleksi” yaklaşımıyla kurumsal etkileşim ve forum kayması dinamikleri incelenmiştir. Bulgular, standart savaşlarının yalnızca teknik çekişmeler değil, aynı zamanda yapısal güç üretimi ve norm inşası mekanizmaları olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışma, orta güçlerin çok katmanlı diplomasi ve kurumsal kapasite güçlendirmesi yoluyla stratejik özerklik kazanabileceğini vurgulamakta ve teknoloji standartlarını uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe yeterince incelenmemiş bir yönetişim alanı olarak konumlandırmaktadır.

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Cite This Article

Arslan, U. (2025). Global Technology Standards And Geopolitical Competition: The Struggle to Set The Rules on 5G and Artificial Intelligence. Ufuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Cilt: 14 Sayı: 28, 227–264. https://doi.org/10.58635/ufuksbedergi.1798697

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