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Journals / Maliye Araştırmaları Dergisi / 2025 / Cilt: 11 Sayı: 2

A Theoretical Analysis of Taxation Diplomacy and Double Taxation Agreements: An Approach from a Game Theory Perspective

Vergi Diplomasisi ve Çifte Vergilendirme Anlaşmalarının Teorik Analizi: Oyun Teorisi Perspektifinden Bir Yaklaşım

Özgür Kızıltoprak(BİTLİS EREN ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0002-1798-3352
Pages
92–114
Publication Date
2026-01-01
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

This multifaceted analysis reveals the dynamic nature of taxation diplomacy and its need for continuous adaptation.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This study draws on the fundamental theories of international relations to examine the complex structure of taxation diplomacy and to create an eclectic theoretical framework in this area.
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Key Findings & Data:The study states that double taxation agreements represent a repeated game and present two Nash equilibria: “Cooperate, Cooperate” and “Compete, Compete”.
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Conclusion & Impact:This multifaceted analysis reveals the dynamic nature of taxation diplomacy and its need for continuous adaptation.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Vergi Diplomasisi · Çifte vergilendirmeyi Önleme Antlaşmaları · Mahkumlar Çıkmazı

Abstract

This study draws on the fundamental theories of international relations to examine the complex structure of taxation diplomacy and to create an eclectic theoretical framework in this area. The paper specifically analyzes double taxation agreements which were developed as a solution to the “race to the bottom” problem in the taxation of multinational corporations' profits from a game theory perspective.When theoretical approaches are examined the Liberal Institutionalism approach evaluates these agreements as beneficial mechanisms that foster cooperation by reducing transaction costs and providing absolute gains. In contrast, the theories of Realism and Critical International Political Economy define tax competition as a zero-sum game arguing that double taxation agreements can lead to tax avoidance through mechanisms like “treaty shopping” which can result in a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. The study states that double taxation agreements represent a repeated game and present two Nash equilibria: “Cooperate, Cooperate” and “Compete, Compete”. In this context, double taxation agreements function as an institutional mechanism that enables states to choose a cooperative strategy thereby keeping themselves and other players in the higher-gain cooperative equilibrium and helping them to avoid a suboptimal competitive equilibrium. This multifaceted analysis reveals the dynamic nature of taxation diplomacy and its need for continuous adaptation.

Özet

Bu çalışmada vergilendirme diplomasisinin karmaşık yapısını incelemek ve bu alanda eklektik bir teorik çerçeve oluşturmak amacıyla uluslararası ilişkilerin temel teorilerinden yararlanılmıştır. Çalışmada özellikle çokuluslu şirketlerin kârlarının vergilendirilmesinde ortaya çıkan “dibe doğru vergi yarışı” sorununa çözüm olarak geliştirilen çifte vergilendirmeyi önleme antlaşmalarını oyun teorisi perspektifinden analiz etmektedir. Teorik yaklaşımlar incelendiğinde, Liberal Kurumsalcılık yaklaşımı bu anlaşmaları işlem maliyetlerini düşürerek ve mutlak kazançlar sağlayarak işbirliğini teşvik eden faydalı mekanizmalar olarak değerlendirmektedir. Buna karşılık Realizm ve Eleştirel Uluslararası Politik Ekonomi teorileri, vergi rekabetini sıfır toplamlı bir oyun olarak tanımlayarak çifte vergilendirmeyi önleme antlaşmalarının “treaty shopping” gibi mekanizmalar aracılığıyla vergi kaçınmasına yol açabileceğini ve pareto etkin olmayan bir nash dengesi doğurabileceğini savunmaktadır. Çalışma, çifte vergilendirmeyi önleme antlaşmalarının tekrarlı bir oyun olduğunu ve “İşbirliği, İşbirliği” ile “Rekabet, Rekabet” olmak üzere iki Nash dengesi sunduğunu belirtmektedir. Bu bağlamda çifte vergilendirmeyi önleme antlaşmaları, devletleri daha yüksek kazançlı işbirliği dengesinde tutan ve suboptimal rekabet dengesinden kaçınmalarını sağlayan kurumsal bir mekanizma işlevi görmektedir. Bu çok yönlü analiz, vergilendirme diplomasisinin dinamik doğasını ve sürekli adaptasyon gereksinimini ortaya koymaktadır.

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Cite This Article

Kızıltoprak, Ö. (2026). A Theoretical Analysis of Taxation Diplomacy and Double Taxation Agreements: An Approach from a Game Theory Perspective. Maliye Araştırmaları Dergisi, Cilt: 11 Sayı: 2, 92–114. https://ajindex.com/articles/1137816

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