Journals / Öneri Dergisi / 1996 / Cilt: 1 Sayı: 5

RANT ARAMA VE X ETKİNSİZLİĞİ

Münevver Soyak(MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ)
Pages
145–149
Publication Date
1996-06-01
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The possibility of an overlap between these two measures is examined. in particular the paper addresses a problem of measure Identification which highlights the need to reconsider the normative microfoundations of rent-seeking.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This paper discusses the social çost of monopoly with special attention given to the geometric representation of that social cost, notably rent-seeking and X-inefficiency.
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Key Findings & Data:This paper discusses the social çost of monopoly with special attention given to the geometric representation of that social cost, notably rent-seeking and X-inefficiency.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:The possibility of an overlap between these two measures is examined. in particular the paper addresses a problem of measure Identification which highlights the need to reconsider the normative microfoundations of rent-seeking.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Rant Arama · X Etkinsizliği

Özet

This paper discusses the social çost of monopoly with special attention given to the geometric representation of that social cost, notably rent-seeking and X-inefficiency. The possibility of an overlap between these two measures is examined. in particular the paper addresses a problem of measure Identification which highlights the need to reconsider the normative microfoundations of rent-seeking.

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Cite This Article

Soyak, M. (1996). RANT ARAMA VE X ETKİNSİZLİĞİ. Öneri Dergisi, Cilt: 1 Sayı: 5, 145–149. https://doi.org/10.14783/maruoneri.703459

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References (13)

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