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Journals / Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları Dergisi / 2017 / Sayı: 72 Özel Sayı

The Legal Systems of Germany and USA Regarding Share- and Stakeholder Capitalism

Harun Kılıç
Pages
171–204
Publication Date
2018-04-10
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Some policy conclusions are drawn for emerging countries to embolden their corporate legal structure.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The legal form of the Modern Corporation inherent in the practiced Corporate Law in the US and UK and Germany have established and codified a working relationship between Corporate key players such as Managers/Directors and Shareholders by taking the conflicts among these players into consideration.
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Key Findings & Data:This paper analyses the Corporate legal framework and systems of US and Germany on a comparable basis together with pros and cons of Agency theory in the context of Shareholder versus Stakeholder Capitalism.
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Conclusion & Impact:Some policy conclusions are drawn for emerging countries to embolden their corporate legal structure.
🔬Design:Derleme
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Shareholder capitalism · stakeholder capitalism · corporate governance

Özet

The legal form of the Modern Corporation inherent in the practiced Corporate Law in the US and UK and Germany have established and codified a working relationship between Corporate key players such as Managers/Directors and Shareholders by taking the conflicts among these players into consideration. E.g., the so called-Agency Theory. This paper analyses the Corporate legal framework and systems of US and Germany on a comparable basis together with pros and cons of Agency theory in the context of Shareholder versus Stakeholder Capitalism. Some policy conclusions are drawn for emerging countries to embolden their corporate legal structure.

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Cite This Article

Kılıç, H. (2018). The Legal Systems of Germany and USA Regarding Share- and Stakeholder Capitalism. Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları Dergisi, Sayı: 72 Özel Sayı, 171–204. https://ajindex.com/articles/1056694

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References (5)

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