A study on transboundary air pollution based on a game theory model: Cases of SO2 emission reductions in the cities of Changsha, Zhuzhou and Xiangtan in China

Özet

Chinanowfacessevereairpollutionproblemswhileconsumingahugequantityofcoal.Atpresent,dueto the emission charges and the emissions trading policy failed to effectively prompt enterprises to reduce emissions and improve air quality. Therefore, improving air quality through regional negotiations and cooperationmaybefeasibleandeffective.Inthisstudy,whichwasbasedongametheory,atransboundary airpollutionmodelwasestablishedtoconductanempiricalstudyonthecost-effectivenessofcooperative SO2 reduction in three cities of Hunan province in China. Four gain allocation mechanisms, i.e., the nucleolus, Nash-Harsanyi allocation solution,Shapleyvalue and SeparableCost Remaining Benefit (SCRB) principle,wereemployedtoallocatethegainsofcooperation,andthefairnessandstabilityofthedifferent allocation mechanisms were also analyzed. The results show that if a gain-sharing mechanism can reasonablyallocatethegainfromfullcooperation,itisthenfeasibleandeffectiveforthethreecitiestofully cooperatetoreduceSO2 emissions.Amongthefourgainallocationmethodsinvestigatedinthisempirical study, the stabilities of gain allocation for full cooperation using SCRB principle and Nash-Harsanyi allocation method were higher than those using the other two allocation methods. The results provide clear empirical evidence that regional gain allocation may affect the sustainability of cooperation. Therefore, although it was desirable to reduce SO2 emissions through cooperation, the long-term sustainability of cooperation should be taken into account in developing relevant policies.