The results reveal that the mediating role of reducing agency costs is crucial to the causal relationship between external corporate governance and post-SEO performance, indicating external corporate governance can enhance performance through direct positive influence on firm performance and, more importantly, through indirect negative influence to decrease agency costs.
📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale
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Amaç & Hipotez:In an analysis of moment structure (AMOS) setting, this study investigates the effectiveness of external corporate governance in mitigating agency costs and enhancing long-term operating performance for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:Additionally, this study hypothesizes the crucial and mediating role of agency costs in the relationship between governance structure and post-SEO operating performance.
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Sonuç & Katkı:The results reveal that the mediating role of reducing agency costs is crucial to the causal relationship between external corporate governance and post-SEO performance, indicating external corporate governance can enhance performance through direct positive influence on firm performance and, more importantly, through indirect negative influence to decrease agency costs.
🔬Tür:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:Alan Parametreleri
Abstract
In an analysis of moment structure (AMOS) setting, this study investigates the effectiveness of external corporate governance in mitigating agency costs and enhancing long-term operating performance for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Additionally, this study hypothesizes the crucial and mediating role of agency costs in the relationship between governance structure and post-SEO operating performance. The results reveal that the mediating role of reducing agency costs is crucial to the causal relationship between external corporate governance and post-SEO performance, indicating external corporate governance can enhance performance through direct positive influence on firm performance and, more importantly, through indirect negative influence to decrease agency costs.
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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap
Huang, C., Wang, N., Wang, F. (2015). HOW EXTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECTS SEOS PERFORMANCE: MEDIATING EFFECT OF AGENCY COSTS. Journal of Business Economics and Finance, Cilt: 4 - Sayı: 2, 1–1. https://ajindex.com/articles/835191
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